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Abstract
As many academics and some judges have openly admitted, no technique of
statutory interpretation can settle every question of statutory ambiguity.
Sometimes Congress enacts legislation containing gaps or inconsistencies that
cannot be resolved through the application of a canon of construction or other
interpretive rule. This article proposes an alternative approach for these hard
cases. When a federal court is faced with a statute that leaves important issues
about its application unclear – particularly issues that implicate the statute’s
constitutionality – the court could stay the case and refer the question to
Congress, much in the same way that courts now use abstention and certification
to obtain answers about the meaning of state law from state courts. If Congress
chooses to clarify the ambiguity by amending the law in accordance with Article
I’s bicameralism and presidential presentment requirements, then the court can
apply the new law to the current case. If Congress chooses not to act, the court
is no worse off than before. Indeed, congressional silence frees judges to be
more creative in their responses to statutory ambiguity because they arguably
have greater leeway to fill gaps or reconcile inconsistencies in an unclear
statutory text that Congress has chosen not to clarify. At the very least, judges
insulate themselves from charges of judicial activism if they seek congressional
input before attempting to interpret unclear statutes.
The article begins by considering whether “certifying” questions to
Congress would be constitutional, and then examines whether adoption of such a
practice would be wise. The discussion of both issues is informed by the fact that
Congress regularly takes notice of judicial confusion and then acts to amend
problem legislation, often explicitly stating an intention to affect the results in
pending cases. Considering that Congress is already assisting courts by
clarifying statutory language at issue in pending cases – albeit in an informal
and ad hoc way – this article concludes that it is worthwhile to formalize the
process and encourage Congress to play an even greater role in resolving
statutory ambiguity before an appellate court issues a definitive ruling.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress frequently enacts legislation containing gaps or inconsistencies
that cannot be resolved through techniques of statutory interpretation.1 The
typical judicial reaction is to try to force meaning from the statute by applying
some canon of construction or interpretive theory, even when the statute and its
legislative history are silent or conflicted on the issue.2 Occasionally, judges will
openly admit the impossibility of ascertaining legislative meaning and conclude
their opinions by calling for Congress to clarify statutory language.3 Yet because
they must resolve the cases before them, judges are still faced with the task of
extracting meaning from an inscrutable statute.
Legal scholars have engaged in a vibrant discourse about the best methods
of resolving statutory ambiguity. Much of the debate has focused on the two
most widely accepted interpretive theories – textualism and intentionalism.4
Both schools incorporate the canons of construction, which have themselves been
the subject of long debate. More recently, proponents of dynamic statutory
interpretation have moved beyond discussion of hermeneutics and have claimed
that courts have the authority to update vague or open-ended statutes to
*
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1
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1987) (“The national legislature expresses itself too often in
commands that are unclear, imprecise, or gap-ridden; in too many cases, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist once wrote, ‘[t]he effort to determine congressional intent . . . might better be
entrusted to a detective than to a judge.’”); Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking –
Judges Who Can’t And Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792-793 (1963)
(“My criticism is directed rather at cases in which the legislature has said enough to
deprive the judges of power to make law even in such subordinate respects but has given
them guidance that is defective in one way or another, and then does nothing by way of
remedy when the problem comes to light.”); Henry John Copeland Nagle, Corrections
Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1280 & n. 43 (1996) (“[T]he courts complain of
ambiguous statutory language daily.”).
2
See, e.g. discussion infra Part I.B.
3
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servcs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2624 (2005)
(noting that 28 U.S.C. 1367 may contain an “unintentional drafting gap” but concluding
that “[i]f that is the case, it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it”); AbdulMalik v. Hawk-Sawyer, 403 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that sentencing statutes raise
separation of powers and federalism concerns and “invit[ing] congressional consideration
of these statutes”); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (“If Congress
erred, however, it is for that body, and not this Court, to correct its mistake.”); Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 603-604 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If adjustment
[of the statute] is in order, as the Court’s opinion powerfully suggests it is, Congress is
equipped to undertake the alteration.”)
4
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419
(2005) (describing the two dominant interpretive methodologies as being textualism and
intentionalism).
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acknowledge changed circumstances or to better accord with evolved social
standards.5 The scholars in all these camps base their critiques of the status quo
and proposals for change on their view of the role judges should play in the
American system of government.6
This article proposes another solution to the problem of intractable statutory
ambiguity – a solution that reflects a different normative view about the place of
the judiciary in our constitutional structure. When a federal court must construe
a statute that leaves important issues about its application unclear, the court
should have the option to stay the case and refer the question to Congress, much
in the same way that courts now use abstention and certification to obtain
answers about the meaning of state law from state courts. Congress may then
clarify the ambiguity by amending the law in accordance with Article I’s
bicameralism and presidential presentment requirements, after which the court
can (in fact, usually must) apply the new law to the pending case.7
Sending truly ambiguous statutes to Congress for clarification is the best use
of courts’ and Congress’s institutional competences. Federal judges, valued for
their independence from politics and public opinion, have neither the expertise
nor the authority to engage in the kind of substantive lawmaking that is required
when they must apply a statute containing significant gaps or conflicting
language. The legislative branch, on the other hand, has the investigative
capabilities and connections with the community to assist it in policymaking, and
its members can be held accountable for their choices by the electorate.
Furthermore, sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress is a more
honest response to truly opaque statutes than attempts at interpretation; when
courts use the canons of construction or theories of interpretation to find meaning
where there is none, they undermine the legitimacy of these important
interpretive tools. Finally, sending questions to Congress provides Congress with
an incentive to take immediate action to avoid a judicial decision that might
establish new law and create new stakeholders, making a congressional override
difficult. At the very least, the process will alert Congress of the problems in
legislative texts and hopefully inspire it to do a better job of drafting future
legislation.8
When judges devote so much of their time and energy to ascertaining
congressional intent and parsing meaning from indeterminate statutory language,
5

See e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) [hereinafter,
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION], RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 20 (1988); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Estimating]
6
As one scholar in this area has declared, “[i]n the end, the quest for statutory meaning
in the absence of formal legislative evidence reduces to a debate over the proper role that
courts should play in construing statutes . . .” Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence,
and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV.1389, 1437 (2005)
7
See discussion infra Parts II & III. As discussed in more detail in Part III, there is some
tension between the principle that courts must apply new law to pending cases and the
presumption against retroactivity. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 264
(1994). However, if Congress is clear that it wishes the law to apply retroactively, and
Congress has not transgressed the “modest” constitutional limitations on its power to do
so, then the Court must apply the new law to pending cases. Id. at 272.
8
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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it is strange not to at least consider bringing the problem to the attention of the
very political branches imbued with the authority to definitively resolve that
ambiguity. Yet courts have never referred ambiguous statutes to Congress for
clarifying amendments and the academic literature contains only a very few
passing references to the concept.9 The reluctance to entertain the idea may stem
from a sense that courts should not be asking Congress to enact laws that resolve
pending cases; the U.S. Constitution carefully separates the lawmaking and
judicial functions, and those lines might be blurred if Congress is encouraged to
craft legislation concerning a dispute in a case before a court.10 Even as courts
and commentators have overlooked or rejected the possibility of referring
ambiguous statutes to Congress, however, Congress has on many occasions taken
note of judicial confusion about the meaning of legislation and stepped in to
amend unclear statutory language.11 Considering that Congress is already
assisting courts by clarifying legislation at issue in pending cases – albeit in an
informal and ad hoc way – this article argues in favor of a formal certification
process that would give the courts a role in selecting the cases in which
Congressional assistance would be helpful.
Part I.A of this article discusses the causes of statutory ambiguity, ranging
from innocent drafting errors to deliberate legislative choices to leave language
unclear, and describes the different schools of statutory interpretation that courts
employ to resolve ambiguities. Part I.B then illustrates the problems posed by
truly opaque statutes by describing three Supreme Court cases from the October
2004 term in which the Court struggled, unconvincingly, to resolve the meaning
of unclear statutory language using these traditional methods of statutory
interpretation.
Part II proposes certifying questions to Congress as an alternative method of
dealing with ambiguous statutes. This Part draws a connection between judicial
referrals to Congress and the theories supporting federal courts’ use of abstention
and certification to provide an opportunity for state courts to decide difficult
questions of state law. Although there are important differences between the two
types of abstention, sending questions to Congress can be justified by many of
the same rationales that underlie certifying questions about the meaning of state
law to state courts. Part II concludes by describing Congress’s long history of
taking notice of judicial confusion and acting to resolve statutory ambiguity –
9

See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev.
2162, 2180-81 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting] (commenting that a
“more straightforward approach” to the problem of statutory ambiguity might be to
certify questions to Congress); Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory
Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 123, 173 (1992) (suggesting at the end of an article on the costs of statutory
ambiguity that federal courts might consider certifying questions of statutory meaning to
Congress).
10
See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures,
and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) (“Traditionally, most academics and
judges have viewed the legislative role as quite separate and distinct from the judicial
role: judges are not to exercise directly legislative powers and legislators are not to
mandate the outcome of particular cases or controversies pending before the federal
courts.”); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance?: Steps for
Legislatures and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1092
(1991); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-34 (1995).
11
See discussion infra Part II.C.
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sometimes on the eve of a circuit court or Supreme Court decision on the matter.
In light of this well-established practice, it makes sense to develop a system by
which courts can seek congressional assistance in cases of their choosing by
certifying questions to Congress.
Part III addresses the constitutional concerns raised by certifying questions
to Congress, and describes the ways in which the process could be structured to
avoid an impermissible intermingling of the functions of the legislative and
judicial branches.
Part IV engages in a normative analysis of the proposal: Assuming that
certifying questions to Congress can be structured so as to pass constitutional
muster – as I argue it can be – would giving Congress an opportunity to weigh in
on pending cases be wise? Powerful arguments can be made that judicial
referrals to Congress are a more democratic, as well as more honest, method of
addressing statutory ambiguity than is the current system under which courts
employ complex and conflicting canons and theories of statutory interpretation to
arrive at a statutory meaning that no elected body enacted into law. On the other
hand, Congress may not be at its best when legislating in the shadow of pending
cases, and transferring cases from the (relatively) apolitical judicial branch to the
nakedly political legislative branch puts unpopular and unsophisticated litigants
at a disadvantage. To illustrate these points, this Part returns to the three cases
discussed in Part I to describe how certification might have resolved the
questions about statutory meaning raised in those cases.
I conclude that certifying questions to Congress would be a valuable
addition to the judicial arsenal, but that it should be used sparingly and with
caution. Certification is worthwhile when it would allow a court to avoid
difficult constitutional questions or would give Congress and the President a role
in deciding significant issues of policy best addressed in the first instance by the
political branches. On the other side of the spectrum, certification might also
make sense in cases in which the statute contains a minor technical error that can
be quickly and easily resolved through clarifying legislation. Congress should
not be consulted, however, when the litigants possess widely differing degrees of
political influence or when Congress might be expected to act hastily to satisfy
shifting and tyrannical majority preferences. Admittedly, distinguishing these
cases will not always be easy, but I argue that it is a more honest exercise than
one in which the courts seek to glean meaning from a statute that contains none.
The article concludes by discussing the significance of congressional
inaction. If a court certified a question to Congress that Congress chose not to
answer – as would likely often occur – I contend that Congress’s silence would
serve as an implicit delegation of legislative power to the courts. Judges could
then engage in more freewheeling and creative reading of legislation than would
be justified had Congress not first turned down the opportunity to clarify
ambiguous statutory language. Moreover, simply by referring questions to
Congress, judges will have bought themselves some political cover against
charges of judicial activism for filling gaps and reconciling inconsistencies in
ambiguous statutes.
I. THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY INDETERMINACY
To evaluate whether certifying questions to Congress is a useful method of
resolving statutory ambiguity, we must first understand why Congress drafts
ambiguous statutes and how courts currently deal with that problem. Part I.A
addresses the causes of statutory indeterminacy and the interpretive methods
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courts employ in response. As any student of the law knows, this is an area of
extensive discussion among not just scholars, but practitioners and judges as
well. The summary below is not meant to be comprehensive or to address the
nuances of the problems of statutory drafting and interpretation – those topics
could each take up an entire law review article by themselves. Rather, my goal
here is to outline a debate that has been richly explored in other sources to
remind the reader of the issues faced by courts in this area before turning to my
proposal to send at least some of these hard cases of statutory construction back
to Congress for consideration.
Part I.B then looks closely at three decisions from the Supreme Court’s 2004
term to observe these methods of interpretation at work, and to illustrate how
frequently they fail to locate meaning in truly ambiguous legislative text.

A. The Judicial Response to Statutory Ambiguity.
Statutes are ambiguous for a variety of reasons. Sometimes the rush to
enact a needed piece of legislation will result in sloppy or inconsistent language
or even outright drafting errors.12 Sometimes Congress will rationally conclude
that it is not worth its time to attempt to predict and address every potential
wrinkle in a statute’s implementation.13 And sometimes the ambiguity arises
from application of the law to a new or unusual circumstance that Congress could
not foresee.14 Less benignly, Congress may choose to enact an ambiguous statute
as a compromise to ensure the statute’s passage; by being purposely vague,
legislative drafters can generate sufficient support for a statute that would fail to
become law were sensitive issues definitively resolved through clear and detailed
statutory language.15
12

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
57, 83 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 433 (1989) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes”].
13
Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627,
640 (2002).
14
Calabresi, supra note __; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the
Classroom and In the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) [herinafter Posner,
Statutory Interpretation]; see also ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 61
(1997) (discussing the different reasons for statutory ambiguity) [hereinafter KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS]. As Judge Posner wrote:
[The] basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is
not that they are poorly drafted – though many are – and not that the
legislators failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute
– though often they do fail – but that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance
of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered
in, its application.
Posner, supra note __, at 811.
15
See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2, 20-22 (1997) (“Some compromises .
. . result in clear statutory language purposely being made unclear.”); Victoria F. Nourse
& Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594 (2002) (noting that legislation often contains “deliberate
ambiguity”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 261 (1994) (“It is entirely
possible – indeed, highly probably – that, because it was unable to resolve the
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Whatever the causes, courts have to deal with the problem of applying
unclear statutes. Interpreting ambiguous statutes has been the focus of an
extraordinary amount of academic discussion16 and judicial debate.17 Although
“theories of statutory interpretation have blossomed like dandelions in the
spring,”18 two dominate the field: textualism and intentionalism.19 Most jurists
also turn to various canons of statutory interpretation to help them construe
opaque statutes. Dynamic statutory interpretation is a relatively new approach
that few jurists would claim to have adopted, but which some scholars forward as
a descriptively accurate account of how judges deal with indeterminate statutes.20
Below is a thumbnail sketch of these approaches, followed by a summary of the
debate about their effectiveness in locating the meaning in an ambiguously
worded text.
1. Textualism
Textualism is an interpretive theory that seeks to find meaning in the
language of the statute as it would have been understood by an observer at the
time of its passage.21 Textualists look only for the objective understanding of the
statute’s language, and thus have no interest in trying to ascertain the intent of the
enacting Congress.22 Indeed, textualists contend that there is no such thing as
congressional “intent” because a multimember body such as Congress cannot
have one unified understanding of the law being enacted.23 Accordingly,
textualists strictly limit the sources they rely on to assist them in interpreting
unclear statutory language: a contemporaneous dictionary definition of a
retroactivity issue . . . Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the
courts.”).
16
See, e.g., Maggs, supra note __, at 136 (“Modern legal scholarship has perhaps dealt
with no single subject more thoroughly than statutory interpretation.”); Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes, supra note __; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990);
Rosenkranz, supra note __, at 2086 (“For as long as there have been statutes, lawyers and
laymen have puzzled over their inevitable ambiguities.”); Elhauge, PreferenceEstimating, supra note __, at 2029.
17
Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“By
far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to interpret the meaning of
federal statutes and federal agency regulations. Thus the subject of statutory
interpretation deserves study and attention in its own right, as the principal business of
judges and (hence) lawyers.”).
18
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note __, at 1. For an
overview of schools of thought regarding statutory interpretation, see KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS, supra note __, at 46-64 (discussing canons of statutory
construction, public interest theory, public choice theory, positive political theory,
textualist theory, and contextualism).
19
See supra note __.
20
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note __, at 9-106.
21
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW vii (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997).
22
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note __, at 17 (“We look for a sort of “objectified” intent – the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law. . . .”). But see,
Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (disputing the notion that
textualists are focused entirely on objective meaning rather than Congress’s subjective
intent).
23
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 433.
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statutory term is useful, but committee reports and floor statements are not.
Textualism has gained prominence as its leading proponents, Justices Scalia and
Thomas on the Supreme Court and Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit,
have risen in the ranks of the federal judiciary.
Proponents consider textualism to be the theory of interpretation most
consistent with democratic values. As Justice Scalia has explained, textualists
focus on the language of the statute and the objective understanding of that
language because “it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or
indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by
what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”24
Government by unexpressed legislative intent is “tyrannical” because it is the law
that should govern, and not the intent of the lawgiver.25 Furthermore, textualists
view intentionalism as a cover for judges to slip their own policy preferences into
statutory interpretation.26 Judges should not enact legislators’ unexpressed intent
into law, but even more so judges should not enact their own policy preferences
into law.
Critics of textualism point out that it is a terribly thin method of gleaning
statutory meaning, and they believe that textualists simply ignore the fact that the
statutory language alone does not always provide the answers.27 They contend
that certain judges have “begun to use textualist methods of construction that
routinely allow them to attribute ‘plain meaning’ to statutory language that most
observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally inconsistent.”28
Mirroring textualists’ critiques of intentionalism, opponents charge that
textualists insert their conservative policy preference into statutes under cover of
“plain language” analysis.29 In sum, textualists’ critics think it lacks the
sophistication needed to find meaning in unclear statutes, and they dispute the
textualists’ assertion that it provides a neutral and value-free method of statutory
interpretation.
2. Intentionalism
Intentionalists construe statutes in an effort to realize the enacting
legislatures’ intent.30 Accordingly, intentionalists will rely on legislative history
and floor debates, and they are willing to construe statutory text in light of the
purpose for which the law was enacted. Like textualists, intentionalists also
claim that their enterprise is consistent with democratic values because they are
enforcing the commands of elected representatives; it is just that intentionalists

24

Scalia, supra note __, at 17.
Id.
26
See, e.g., id at 17-18.
27
Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The Conflict
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 656-57 (2005)
(“[A] leading criticism of textualism” is that “in too many situations, the statutory text
just does not provide enough guidance.”)
28
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752
(1995).
29
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Forward].
30
See John J. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and Legitimacy, 75 TEX. L. REV. 435,
465-66 (1996).
25
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view courts as agents of the legislature, while textualists want courts to serve as
agents of the statute itself.31
Intentionalism, like textualism, cannot rid statutes of all ambiguity. The
legislature may not have anticipated every situation in which the statute comes
into play, and thus there will be no legislative purpose to guide the court in its
application of the statute in unforeseen circumstances. And it does not always
make sense to discuss the “intent” of a multimember institution like a legislature,
which may have many different and sometimes conflicting purposes in mind
when enacting a statute.32 As public choice theorists have pointed out, if the
statute is a jumble of trade-offs among interest groups, then it is impossible to
extrapolate from some nonexistent consensus about the statute’s end goals to fill
gaps or reconcile inconsistencies.33 In such cases, there is no “spirit” to be
attributed to the legislation, but rather a legislative middle ground in which each
side got some, but not all, of what it wanted. To interpret the law in light of
some greater purpose would then undermine the compromise that allowed the
legislation to be enacted into law in the first place.34 In short, critics contend that
the very idea of a discoverable legislative intent or statutory spirit is a chimera
that often serves as a cover for judicial lawmaking.
3. Canons of Construction
Another method of resolving statutory ambiguity is to employ canons of
construction that set default rules to assist in interpretation. Some canons are
valued simply as common-sense guides to the reading of any text – for example,
the canon that specific statutory provisions qualify general ones or that words in
a statute should not be rendered superfluous.35 Some canons incorporate
presumptions about how the legislative process works – for example, repeals by
implication are disfavored, and appropriations statutes are presumed not to
modify substantive law.36 More generally, canons are valued as providing a set
of default rules against which Congress legislates, so that courts are simply
applying the same tools to interpret that Congress used in drafting.37 In addition
to incorporating these values into the process of statutory construction, canons
are praised as a method of limiting judicial discretion because they require judges
to rely on something other than their own policy preferences when interpreting
unclear statutes.
Yet the claimed benefits of the canons of statutory construction have been
repeatedly challenged. As Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey rather
bluntly put it: “almost everybody thinks that canons are bunk.”38 Judge Richard
31

Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 415.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 433.
33
Nelson, supra note __, at 370-71.
34
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 427 (“The characterization of
legislative purpose is an act of creation rather than discovery.”).
35
See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989).
36
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980).
37
Eskridge & Frickey, Forward, supra note __, at 27 (“The usefulness of the canons . . .
does not depend upon the Court’s choosing the ‘best’ canons for each proposition.
Instead, the canons may be understood as conventions, similar to driving a car on the
right-hand side of the road; often it is not as important to choose the best convention as it
is to choose one convention, and stick to it.”).
38
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 630 (1988).
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Posner has questioned the logic of many of the canons and argued that they do
not, in fact, embody common-sense interpretive rules.39
Some of the
assumptions about how the legislative process works are overly idealistic and
inaccurate. As Posner noted, why should repeals by implication be disfavored
when there is no evidence that Congress “combs the United States Code for
possible inconsistencies with the new statute, and when it spots one, it repeals the
inconsistency explicitly”?40 And why should words in a statute never be read to
create a redundancy when we know that Congress can be sloppy when drafting
statutory language?41 Most vociferously refuted is the idea that canons prevent
judges from enacting their policy preferences. Professor Karl Llewellyn
famously demonstrated that for every canon one could find an opposing canon,
allowing judges to justify any result by citing to some purportedly neutral canon
of statutory construction.42
The canon of constitutional avoidance has been the subject of particularly
close scrutiny. The benefits of the canon are oft-cited by courts – it enables the
judiciary to resolve cases without having to expound on constitutional meaning
or risk the direct conflict with Congress that would occur were the court to strike
down legislation as unconstitutional.43 Yet commentators have questioned
judicial authority to construe statutes to avoid potential constitutional issues – at
least without first determining with certainty that the most straightforward
reading of the statute would be constitutionally problematic. Critics contend that
when courts skew the reading of statutes to avoid even having to consider hard
constitutional questions, they are essentially making a legislative, not a judicial,
choice.44
4. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
Eskridge, one of the leading proponents of dynamic theories of statutory
interpretation, has argued that courts should, and in fact already do, construe
statutes “dynamically,” by which he means “in light of their present societal,
political and legal context.”45 Eskridge has mustered evidence to show that
courts seem to take into account signals of current congressional preferences,
perhaps to avoid the potential for a congressional override of a judicial decision
about statutory meaning that Congress does not like.46 Eskridge is joined by
many other commentators who advocate incorporating public opinion and current

39

Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note __, at 805.
Id. at 812.
41
Id.
42
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960); Posner, Statutory
Interpretation, supra note __, at 817 (“Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the
canons do not constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the
appearance that his decisions are constrained.”). But see Scalia, supra note __, at 26-27.
43
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1946).
44
See, e.g., See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in
Judicial Activism?, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1401, 1405 (2002) (criticizing the avoidance
canon as “a roving commission to rewrite statutes to taste”); Frederick Schauer,
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 98 (1995).
45
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1479 (1987).
46
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
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social norms into statutory interpretation.47 Guido Calabresi has gone a step
further and called for courts to “update” statutes in the same ways that courts
adjust and amend the common law to take into account changing times.48
Dynamic statutory interpretation theory also has its critics. From an
institutional competence perspective, it is argued that judges are not well-situated
to determine current societal preferences because they lack the ties to
constituents and the investigative capabilities that legislatures can use to gauge
public opinions.49 Furthermore, when judges update statutory meaning to accord
with current views of the public good, they usurp legislative power and expand
their own role in government far beyond what the Constitution intended. The
very vagueness of the task will lead judges to insert their own policy preferences
into the statutory text because they cannot locate public opinion.
Seeking to address these concerns, Professor Einer Elhauge has recently
published a series of articles suggesting that when judges are faced with statutory
indeterminacy they should look to evidence of what the current Congress would
do, rather than amorphous “societal preferences” on which other dynamic
theorists would have courts rely.50 Although Elhauge’s proposal has the benefit
of narrowing the sources to which a court can look to update statutes,51 there will
likely be little or no evidence of what a current legislature thinks of a statute
enacted decades ago. If a court is truly unable to determine current legislative
preferences, Elhauge proposes that the court adopt a construction of the statute
designed to elicit a congressional response – his goal being to replace
indeterminate statutory language with that approved by a majority of the current
Congress.52
In turn, Elhauge’s proposal has been criticized by Professor Amanda Tyler
on the ground that it “erodes core separation of powers principles” by asking
judges to “divin[e]” current legislative preferences before they become law.53
She rejects his presumption that courts can issue opinions that will provoke
legislatures into enacting legislation to override them, and, even if they could,
pursuing this goal would be an evasion of judicial interpretive responsibilities
and a usurpation of legislative power.54 This debate, as Tyler recognizes, turns
on one’s views regarding the role of the judge: Tyler values judges as
“‘guardians’” of “‘continuity and predictability’” in statutory interpretation; she
is concerned that dynamic theories of statutory interpretation value the judge’s
creative role too highly, and at the expense of the judge’s role in providing
legislative stability.55
B. The Limits of Interpretation
47

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 313-54 (1986); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes,
supra note __, at 451.
48
CALBRESI, supra note __.
49
See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J.
27, 60 (2003) (“Judges are relatively poorly equipped to identify social problems or
undertake their own factual investigations into those problems.”); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31-36 (1938).
50
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note __.
51
Id. at 2030-31.
52
Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting, supra note __, at 2165.
53
Tyler, supra note __, at 1392.
54
Id.
55
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As many academics and some judges have openly admitted, no technique of
interpretation can resolve every question of statutory ambiguity.56 Posner
acknowledged the problem when he asked: “[W]hat if a judge’s scrupulous
search for the legislative will turns up nothing? There are of course such cases,
and they have to be decided some way.”57 Each term, the Supreme Court
grapples with questions about statutory meaning that have divided the courts of
appeals because there is no meaning that can be extracted from the legislative
text or history. Such cases demonstrate the limits of traditional methods of
statutory interpretation and, consequently, the need to find alternative ways to
ascertain the meaning of ambiguous statutes.
To illustrate the problem, three cases from this past term are described
below. Each case presents what I believe is an intractable statutory construction
problem; that is, an interpretive problem that cannot be resolved by any
hermeneutic technique. Yet in each case, the majority and dissent both claimed
to find meaning in the statute by employing textualism, intentionalism, a canon
of statutory construction, or some combination of the three. Nor did any of the
cases raise a question on which there was a clear societal or congressional
preference that could have guided the Court.
1. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education58 raised the question whether
the private right of action in Title IX extends to a claim by the male coach of a
girls basketball team that he had been retaliated against for complaining that the
team was not receiving equal funding and access to athletic equipment and
facilities. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”59 The Court framed the issue as being whether
“retaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’” and thus is a cause of action
that can be brought under Title IX.60 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit had dismissed the retaliation claim on the ground that “[n]othing in the
text indicates any congressional concern with retaliation that might be visited on
those who complain of Title IX violations.”61 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits on that point.62
The Supreme Court was closely divided on the question, with the five
justices in the majority holding that the language of Title IX included retaliation
claims and the four dissenters concluding that it did not. Although the majority
56

See, e.g., Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note __, at 2029 (“Statutory
interpretation involves two crucial issues. (1) How should courts divine the meaning of
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meaning?”).
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Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note __, at 821. Posner advocates that in such
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125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
59
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
60
Id. at 1504.
61
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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125 S. Ct. at 1503 (citing to the conflicting decisions in Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ.
System, 117 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) and Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River
Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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acknowledged that other civil rights statutes specifically refer to retaliation
claims, it concluded that this omission from Title IX was insignificant in light of
the fact that Title IX is broadly written: “Because Congress did not list any
specific discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX,” the majority reasoned,
“its failure to mention one such practice does not tell us anything about whether
it intended that practice to be covered.”63 Further support for this interpretation
came from Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,64 a Supreme Court case decided
three years before Title IX was enacted that held that a general prohibition on
racial discrimination covered retaliation against those seeking to protect the
rights of people directly covered by the statute. The majority stated, “’it is not
only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly
familiar with [Sullivan] and that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be
interpreted in conformity with [Sullivan].’”65 Furthermore, the majority
concluded that “[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX
enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report
went unpunished.”66 Thus, the majority’s argument relied on all the traditional
“intentionalist” methods of statutory construction – such as reliance on the text’s
broad language, the context of the statute’s enactment, and the statutory purpose
– to conclude that Congress intended to cover retaliation.
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis, flatly declaring that “the
natural meaning of the phrase ‘on the basis of sex’ is on the basis of the
plaintiff’s sex, not the sex of some other person.”67 The dissent then relied on a
number of equally well-accepted tools of statutory interpretation to bolster its
interpretation of the text. For example, the dissenters pointed to canons of
construction requiring Congress to speak clearly when imposing liability on
states through the spending power, and the presumption against implying a cause
of action when Congress has not made such a remedy clear.68 Because these
canons counseled against finding a cause of action for retaliation, and because
the dissenters found the text unclear at best, they could not agree that Title IX
allowed claims for retaliation.
In the final analysis, Jackson presented a question of statutory construction
for which there was no clear answer. Whether a private cause of action could be
brought for retaliation divided the Supreme Court five to four and the circuit
courts two to one. Each side could muster arguments based on theories of
interpretation and canons of construction, but ultimately none could provide a
satisfying response to the question whether the statute allowed claims for
retaliation.
Jackson was also a case with clear ideological battle lines: liberals favor the
conclusion that there is a cause of action for retaliation, while conservatives do
not. Four of the five justices in the majority – Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens – are commonly perceived to be the relatively liberal members of the
Court, while three of the four dissenters – Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist – are
considered the Court’s staunchest conservatives. Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy played their usual swing vote role, with O’Connor’s decision to join the
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 1505.
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1511.
Id. at 1514.
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liberals giving them the majority. Unsurprisingly, the decision was criticized as
an activist decision by liberal judges willing to ignore statutory text in favor of
their policy preferences.69
2. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United
States ex rel. Wilson
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. Wilson70 required the
Court to address a rather mundane question about the statute of limitations period
for retaliation claims under the False Claims Act (FCA). In a provision codified
at 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), the FCA prohibits making false or fraudulent claims for
compensation from the United States. Section 3730(b)(1) permits private
individual to bring actions for violations in the government’s name. In its 1986
amendments to the Act, Congress added section 3730(h), which established a
private cause of action for an individual retaliated against by his employer for
assisting an FCA investigation. At issue in Graham County was the section
establishing the statute of limitations, 3731(b)(1), which provides that “[a] civil
action under section 3730 may not be brought (1) more than six years after the
date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.” All agreed that
section 3731(b)(1) establishes a six-year statute of limitations for claims
regarding the making of a false claim. The question to be resolved by the Court
was whether that six-year limitations period also applies to retaliation claims
brought under section 3730(h). A panel of the Fourth Circuit split on that issue,71
and the courts of appeals were divided as well.72
By a vote of 7-2, the Court held that section 3731(b)(1)’s limitations period
did not apply to retaliation claims. Even though section 3731(b)(1) sets a six
year statute of limitations for any “civil action under section 3730,” and even
though retaliation is a “civil action under section 3730,” the majority concluded
that the statute was “ambiguous” as to whether the limitations period applies to
retaliation claims.73 The majority again took the intentionalist approach, citing
the principle that statutory language has to be “read in its proper context,”74 and
noting that other provisions of the statute relating to the limitations period were
inconsistent with the conclusion that it applied to retaliation claims.75 For
example, the statute of limitations begins to run “on the date on which the
violation of section 3729 is committed” – that is, the date on which a defendant
submitted a false claim. That start date makes no sense for retaliation claims,
which do not require the plaintiff to allege that a false claim was made.

69

Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principles and the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 373 n.180 (2005) (describing Jackson as a decision
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125 S. Ct. 2444 (2005).
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Moreover, this anomaly could lead to the expiration of the statute of limitations
for retaliation claims before the retaliatory behavior began.76
After concluding that the statutory language was unclear when read in
context, the majority then applied the “default rule that Congress generally drafts
statutes of limitations to begin when the cause of action accrues.”77 That “rule of
construction” led the majority to the conclusion that the six-year statute of
limitation in section 3731(b)(1) did not apply to retaliation claims.78 The
majority was still left with the problem of finding a statute of limitations for
retaliation claims. Following its long practice when Congress fails to set a
limitations period, the court held that the most closely analogous state statute of
limitations should apply to retaliation claims under the FCA.79
In dissent, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg made a textualist argument. In
their view, Congress had written a “reasonably clear” statute. The six year
statute of limitations in section 3731(b)(1) applies to any “civil action under
section 3730,” which includes retaliation claims. Although the dissenters agreed
that it is “unusual” for Congress to set the statute of limitations running before
the injury occurs, they found nothing to prevent Congress from taking this
course. They concluded that “Congress has written such a statute here, and the
Court should respect its decision.”80
Graham County raised a very close question of statutory interpretation that
seems to have no definitive answer. The plain text favors the dissenters’ reading,
but there is the oddity that a false claim appears to serve as the triggering event to
start the limitations period running on the retaliation claim, suggesting either that
the trigger event itself was a drafting error, or that Congress did not intend for the
six year statute of limitations period to apply to retaliation claims. Congress was
unclear, and neither the default rules of construction employed by the majority
nor the plain language arguments made by the dissent are satisfying
interpretations of the statute as it is written. One is left with the distinct suspicion
that Congress simply never gave this issue any thought.
3. Clark v. Martinez
Clark v. Martinez81 required the Court to address for a second time
ambiguous wording in the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding detention
of aliens ordered removed from the United States. The provision at issue, 8
U.S.C. 1231(a)(6), provides that “[a]n alien ordered removed . . . may be
detained beyond the removal period.” This provision applies to several
categories of aliens, including: 1) inadmissible aliens ordered removed; and 2)
aliens who were originally admitted to the United States and later ordered
removed. The question in Zadvydas v. Davis,82 decided in 2001, was whether
section 1231(a)(6) permitted indefinite detention of aliens in the second category,
while the question before the Court in Clark concerned the permissible length of
detention for aliens who fell into the first category because they were never
legally admitted to the United States.
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
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Zadvydas concerned two aliens admitted to the United States but then
subsequently ordered removed. No country would accept them, however, and as
a result the aliens were kept in detention by the government for years with no
reasonably foreseeable chance of being deported. The aliens argued that the
statute did not permit their indefinite detention by immigration authorities, while
the government contended that “the statute means what it literally says”: “It sets
no ‘limit on the length of time . . . that an alien . . . may be detained.’”83 By a
vote of 5 to 4, the Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not permit
indefinite detention but rather allowed detention “only as long as ‘reasonably
necessary’ to remove [an alien] from the country.”84
The Court explained that the statute’s use of the word “may” in the
provision stating that aliens “may be detained beyond the removal period”
“suggests discretion” regarding the length of detention, but “not necessarily . . .
unlimited discretion. In that respect, the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”85 Because
the indefinite detention of aliens who had been admitted to the country, like
Zadvydas, raised serious constitutional concerns, the Court interpreted the statute
to permit only detention necessary to accomplish removal; “once removal is no
longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized.”86
The Court further held that “the presumptive period during which the detention
of an alien is reasonably necessary to effectuate his removal is six months; after
that, the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is
‘no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”87 In
sum, the Court concluded that the statutory language was unclear as to the
amount of time aliens could be detained, and it applied the canon of
constitutional avoidance to limit that period.
The question in Clark v. Martinez was whether Zadvydas’s interpretation of
section 1231(a)(6) also applies to the first category of aliens – that is, those
ordered removed who were never admitted to the United States. The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits had split on this issue. Seven Justices concluded that it must
give the provision the same meaning as they did in Zadvydas. The two
dissenters, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the
presumptive six-month limit imposed by the Court in Zadvydas rested largely on
an interpretation of the language required by the canon of constitutional doubt – a
canon that was not applicable in the case of an alien who had never been legally
admitted to the United States and whose detention could thus not implicate the
same pressing constitutional questions.88 The majority responded that this
reasoning “cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different meaning
when [a different categories of] aliens are involved.” The ambiguity in the
statutory language, coupled with the constitutional concerns raised by its
application to at least one category of aliens, required that the Court graft a
presumptive six-month limit into the detention provision.
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Zadvydas and Clark are classic constitutional avoidance cases. The
statutory language was not perfectly clear and the result of one reading was
constitutionally suspect, so the Court applied the canon to avoid addressing
whether the constitution would permit indefinite detention of an alien. Applying
that canon further required that the Court invent an amount of time that the aliens
could be detained. The Court concluded that six months was a reasonable period,
after which the government had to either demonstrate a foreseeable chance of
removal or release the aliens. As is obvious from reading the statute and the
opinions, that six month period was entirely the creation of a Court struggling to
avoid striking down an ambiguous statute as unconstitutional.
Conclusion
The three cases discussed above all involved questions about the meaning of
unclear statutes that divided the circuit courts and the Supreme Court justices.
As these three cases illustrate, no theory of interpretation or canon of
construction can help courts resolve truly inscrutable statutes. Congress appears
to have left open the question whether Title IX creates a cause of action for
retaliation, whether the six-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act
applies to retaliation claims, and the length of time that aliens can be detained
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Absent congressional assistance, courts have no choice but to plow ahead
and do their best to resolve cases in as principled a manner as possible. In some
of these cases, however, the courts might be wiser to abstain from searching for
meaning where there plainly is none, and instead ask Congress to step in and
clarify ambiguous or poorly written text. Considering that Congress created the
problem, and that Congress is capable of undoing any judicial decision about the
meaning of statutory text, it follows that Congress is the institution best-situated
to resolve disagreements about the meaning of statutes. Just as important, the
judiciary will have gained even if Congress does not respond to its query. If the
language of a statute is unclear, and if Congress chooses not to assist a court by
clarifying its meaning after a court requests it to do so, then courts are
empowered by that congressional silence to make law to replace the ambiguous
text before it.89
II. The Proposal:
Certifying Questions of Statutory Ambiguity to
Congress.
A. The Proposal
Although the techniques of statutory interpretation described in Part I.A
continue to be used widely by judges, they are criticized as providing cover for
judicial overreaching, and none can identify the meaning of truly ambiguous
statutes, as was illustrated in Part I.B. This article proposes that courts consider
an alternative method of dealing with at least some types of statutory ambiguity:
Courts should have the option of referring questions about statutory meaning to
Congress, much the same way courts now certify questions about the meaning of
ambiguous state law to state courts.
Certification of questions to Congress would work as follows: When a court
concludes that a statute it is asked to address is unclear, it could choose to stay
the case, refer the problem to Congress, and await a response that would apply to
the pending case. If no response was forthcoming within a reasonable period of
time, the court could then go ahead and decide the case with the newfound
89
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freedom arising from Congress’s implicit delegation of the legislative task of
filling gaps or reconciling inconsistencies in the statute’s text. For example, had
certification been available last term, the Court could have granted certiorari in
Jackson, Graham County, and Clark, and then referred its questions about the
meaning of the statutes in those three cases to Congress. If Congress had not
taken up the question, the Court could have decided the cases on its own; if
Congress did respond by amending the statute at issue to clarify its meaning, the
Court could then remand the case and allow the lower court to apply the amended
statute in the first instance.90
Although a few scholars have briefly raised the possibility of certifying
questions to Congress, there has been no detailed discussion in the academic
literature about whether such a process would be constitutional or useful to the
courts.91 Several prominent judges have supported the different, but not entirely
unrelated, idea of establishing committees that would focus on identifying and
revising problem legislation. Justice Benjamin Cardozo recommended the
creation of a Ministry of Justice composed of law professors, judges, and
practitioners to perform that task.92 Judge Henry Friendly revived Cardozo’s
idea in 1963, though he thought the committee should be located in the
legislative rather than the executive branch.93 Further elaborating on these
proposals, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested the creation of a “second
look at laws” congressional committee that would engage in “statutory
housekeeping” by fixing grammatical problems and ambiguous language
identified by courts.94 None of these proposals were ever acted upon, however,
most likely because they required adding a layer of bureaucracy to an already
over-burdened system. Moreover, these committee-based proposals address
problems only after a court has been forced to issue a decision regarding the
meaning of the statute – setting in stone an interpretation that would be difficult
for Congress to undo. Nor do these committees give Congress the same
incentive to take action that it would have were a court to abstain for a set period
while awaiting Congress’s response to a referral.
Permitting courts to certify questions to Congress thus has significant
advantages over a roving committee, but also raises separation of powers
concerns that the committee-based solutions avoid. Part III analyzes the ways in
which a certification process must be structured to avoid overstepping
constitutional boundaries. Part IV addresses how and when certification should
be used: that is, which courts should have the power to certify questions to
Congress, which type of questions they should refer, and how they should deal
with a congressional response (or non-response). Before delving into the nuts
90

The proposal discussed here is limited to federal courts and Congress. Conceivably,
federal courts could certify questions about state law to state legislatures, and state courts
could certify questions about federal law to Congress. Because federal courts already
have the option to certify questions about state law to state courts, there is a less pressing
need for federal courts to obtain legislative assistance with the interpretation of state law.
Allowing state courts to certify questions to Congress would be problematic because it
would significantly the number of courts seeking Congress’s attention and possibly
disrupting its legislative agenda – a problem addressed in Part IV. See infra notes __ to
__.
91
See supra note __.
92
Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921).
93
Friendly, supra note __.
94
Ginsburg & Huber, supra note __, at 1432.

18

Certifying Questions to Congress

and bolts of how certifying questions to Congress would work in practice,
however, this Part describes how the federal courts have long accepted, and even
welcomed, the involvement of other institutions in decisionmaking. In light of
this history, certification to Congress can be understood as an extension of
current practice rather than as a radical new concept.
B. Drawing on the Tradition of Certification to State Courts.
The idea of certifying questions to Congress might at first seem anomalous.
Courts are supposed to decide the questions that come before them, not abstain
and await a decision on the matter from another branch of government. And yet
the concept has a pre-existing analogue in the certification and abstention
procedures regularly used by federal courts to obtain state court clarification of
state law. Although certifying questions to state courts is relatively new, “the use
of certification is on the rise.”95 For the most part, federal and state courts, as
well as state legislatures, have embraced the practice for reasons that should
make certifying questions to Congress similarly attractive to federal judges and
Congress.
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,96 the Supreme Court first
established that federal courts should abstain from deciding the meaning of
ambiguous state laws that raise federal constitutional concerns, and should
instead issue a stay and order the parties to litigate the state law issues in state
court. Only after the state court system establishes the meaning of state law will
the case return to the federal court for resolution of the federal question, if
necessary.97 Because abstention often resulted in significant delays, most of the
states have now established streamlined certification procedures that allow a
federal court to retain jurisdiction of a case while sending directly to the state
supreme court a question about the meaning of state law.98 After the state
supreme court decides the issue, the case returns to the federal court for a final
decision on the question of federal law, which typically delays resolution of a
case for no more than six months.99
Certifying questions to Congress would follow that same basic form as
certification to a state court: the federal court would stay the case, retain
jurisdiction, inform Congress of the question of statutory interpretation at issue,
and then await a congressional response that the court will use to resolve the
case. The federal court could lift the stay and decide the case if Congress did not
appear inclined to respond.
Many of the rationales for using abstention and certification to resolve
questions about the meaning of state law also support certifying questions of
federal law to Congress. Sending questions to state courts is justified on the
ground that state judges are better situated to resolve state law issues: state
95
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judges are more familiar with state law and state interests and they carry the
legitimacy that comes from having been selected through the state political
process to construe and apply state law.100 Leaving hard questions about the
meaning of state law to state courts also makes practical sense; state courts retain
the last word on any state law matter, and thus a federal judge’s interpretation of
state law might be immediately reversed by a state court pronouncement.
The same can be said of Congress and its role in establishing the meaning of
federal law. As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, Congress, not the courts, is
the proper institution to fill gaps in legislation and to clarify un-interpretable
ambiguities or inconsistencies in statutory language.101 These are essentially acts
of lawmaking, not law construction or implementation, and thus are best
performed by the policy-making legislative branch. There is no debate that
Congress, not the judiciary, is the institution best-suited to write laws in the first
instance; Congress has the relationship with constituents, access to information,
and accountability to the general public that make it better qualified to engage in
lawmaking.102 Considering their relative institutional competencies, Congress,
not courts, should take the lead in supplying statutory meaning when litigation
reveals that a piece of legislation leaves some significant question unanswered.
Like state courts, Congress is also the institution with the “last word” on statutory
meaning; Congress can, and often does, override judicial construction of federal
statutes.103 Accordingly, when federal courts supply meaning for unclear
statutes, they risk having wasted time and effort if Congress immediately
overrides the judicial decision through a legislative amendment.
Certification to state courts is also justified as a means by which federal
courts can avoid making pronouncements about the constitutionality of
legislation.104 A state court may construe state law to sidestep a constitutional
problem that a federal court might otherwise have to address and resolve.
Certification to Congress can serve the same purpose. If Congress receives a
question about statutory meaning from a federal court, and it learns that the court
is concerned that the statute may be unconstitutional, Congress can clarify
statutory language to steer clear of the constitutional conflict.
The analogy is not exact, however. Abstention and certification procedures
in the context of questions about state law are intended to promote principles of
federalism and comity – goals that judicial referrals to Congress obviously do not
share. State sovereignty is highly valued in our federal system, and certification
and abstention permit states to maintain some control over interpretation and
administration of their own laws. Not incidentally, many of the cases in which
abstention was first established concerned sensitive state policies (such as the
question of race discrimination in Pullman105) and issues concerning state
sovereignty (such as the state’s eminent domain powers in Louisiana Power and
Light Co v. City of Thibodaux106). Allowing state courts to decide these types of
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questions demonstrates respect for state judicial systems and avoids the friction
that might result from a federal court decision on a delicate question of state law.
But even though comity and federalism are not at stake when a federal court
refers a question to Congress, such referrals do promote similar goals by
demonstrating judicial deference to, and respect for, a co-equal branch of
government. Ideally, Congress and the courts would work together to make laws
clear and easily administrable. When a court seeks Congress’s input before
construing ambiguous statutes, it is both notifying Congress of problems in
statutory drafting and providing Congress with the opportunity to take the lead in
clarifying the legislation. Just as federal courts’ deference to states reduces
friction between state and federal systems, similar deference to Congress may
serve to limit the occasions on which courts and Congress come into conflict
over the meaning of a statutory text. Easing tensions between Congress and
courts, always important, is particularly vital at this moment in time, when the
two branches are very publicly clashing on an almost daily basis.107
Despite these parallels between certification to Congress and to state courts,
sending a statute to another court for its interpretation is admittedly different
from sending it back to the legislature with a request that the language be
rewritten. The analogy is useful, however, if only to show that courts have
accepted and even embraced a procedure that allows them to delegate the task of
statutory construction to an outside entity, suggesting that certifying questions to
Congress is not so foreign to current federal court practice as it might first
appear.
C. Delegating Questions of Statutory Interpretation to Federal
Agencies.
Courts regularly rely on federal agencies to assist in the interpretation of
ambiguous federal laws. Chevron U.S.A v. Natural Resources Defense
Council108 and its progeny have established that courts should defer to a
reasonable agency construction of an ambiguous statute if that interpretation was
generated through a rulemaking proceeding carrying the force of law. Although
Chevron asserted that Congress had delegated the interpretive authority to
agencies by enacting statutes that agencies are responsible for administering, of
course it was the Supreme Court that declared that reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes should trump reasonable judicial
interpretations.
Chevron deference suggests that courts are comfortable giving the lead in
statutory “clarification” to another institution. Although courts limit agency
authority by deferring only when a statute is truly ambiguous, the agency’s
reading is reasonable, and the agency has acted through a deliberative process to
produce a rule carrying the force of law, courts have nonetheless given away a
107
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significant aspect of what had formally been viewed as the judiciary’s sole power
“to say what the law is.”109 Moreover, the rationales for doing so is that agencies
are institutionally better suited to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in their
governing statutes because they have more expertise and greater politically
accountability than courts – rationales that similarly support giving Congress the
first opportunity to resolve intractable statutory ambiguity when there is no
agency interpretation to assist the court.110
D. Congress’s Longstanding Practice of Clarifying Legislation in
Pending Cases.
Certifying questions to Congress would formalize a long tradition of
cooperation between the two branches. Even though no certification process is
currently in place, Congress nonetheless amends legislation at issue in pending
cases, often after becoming aware of judicial confusion about the meaning of
statutory language.111 Throughout their history the federal courts have accepted,
and at times eagerly embraced, congressional assistance in statutory
interpretation. United States v. Schooner Peggy112 established early on that
courts must apply current law to pending cases even when Congress amends the
law after the case was brought, and even when Congress’s express purpose is to
affect the results in that case.113 In at least two cases the Supreme Court deferred
issuing a decision to give Congress more time to consider a proposed amendment
that would moot the case, thereby actively helping Congress to resolve the
question before the Court was forced to address it.114
Legislative involvement in pending cases is thus a longstanding aspect of
legislative-judicial interactions.115 Because this practice is relevant to the
feasibility, desirability, and constitutionality of a formal process of certifying
questions to Congress, it is investigated in some detail here. First, this article
reviews the data on congressional efforts to amend statutes that have caused
judicial confusion, which demonstrates that Congress will attempt to clarify
statutory language when it sees courts struggling with a statute’s application,
although it is not always successful in enacting its legislative fixes into law.
Second, this article examines the Supreme Court’s reaction to Congress’s efforts
to amend confusing statutory language to assist it with a pending case.
1. Congressional Efforts to Amend Unclear Statutory Language.
A pair of scholars, Stefanie Lindquist and David Yalof, studied the
frequency with which Congress reacted to circuit court conflict over statutory
language by passing legislation to resolve the question, thereby obviating
Supreme Court review. They discovered that between 1990 and 1998, Congress
“sought to amend existing statutes or to pass new legislation to resolve at least 19
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instances of conflict among the circuits.”116 During that time, 66 different
appeals court decisions were identified in legislation seeking to resolve 26
different circuit court conflicts. Attached to their article is a table that describes
the proposed bills, the conflicts each was enacted to resolve, and whether the bill
was enacted into law. Lindquist and Yalof conclude from this data that
“Congress adopts some role in ensuring that its statutes are applied uniformly
throughout the country, although Congress is not nearly as active as the Supreme
Court in this area.”117
Lindquist and Yalof concluded that Congress is more likely to get involved
in resolving intercircuit splits when the Supreme Court denies certiorari.
However, because Congress may not be able to react to a circuit conflict with
sufficient speed to address the issue before the Supreme Court grants the case
and resolves the question, congressional silence does not necessarily suggest a
desire to let the Supreme Court resolve the issue in the first instance. At the very
least, the fact that Congress takes an interest in reacting to circuit splits, even
though it does not always manage to enact legislation to resolve them, suggests
that Congress is willing to play a role in clarifying unclear statutes.
2. Judicial Reaction to Congressional Interference in Pending
Cases.
Congress frequently affects the results in pending cases when it amends
legislation. Courts have developed doctrines to deal with this recurring situation
– for example, courts generally hold that an amendment to a relevant statute will
moot a pending case that turns on the now-altered provision.118 On occasion,
courts have actively assisted Congress in its efforts to moot pending cases by
staying a case to await passage of a proposed bill. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
decision to grant a writ of certiorari may turn on whether it appears that the
statute at issue will be amended in the near future.
As is evident from the cases discussed below, judicial reaction to
congressional interference in pending cases is generally positive. Courts appear
to welcome Congressional assistance in resolving disputes over statutory
meaning, and express concern about Congressional interference only when it
appears that Congress is legislating to control the outcome of a specific case
rather than clarifying the law generally.
a. Hayburn’s Case
Hayburn’s Case,119 which concerns Revolutionary War veteran William
Hayburn’s efforts to obtain a pension for his military service, has become a
constitutional chestnut; it is one of the very oldest cases still regularly cited by
courts. Yet the Supreme Court never actually issued an opinion on the merits,
choosing instead to postpone a decision in the hope that Congress would amend
the legislation at issue, as Congress ultimately did. The case is a classic example
judicial effort to avoid a confrontation with Congress – especially important at
this early stage in the nation’s history when the federal courts had not yet
established their authority to strike down acts of Congress as unconstitutional.
116
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Hayburn had claimed eligibility for a federal pension under the Invalid
Pension Act of 1792. The Act required injured veterans of the Revolutionary
War to petition the judges of the United States Circuit Courts, who were to
determine whether the petitioner qualified for a pension. The judges were then to
submit the name and a recommendation for the amount of the pension to the
Secretary of War, who would review the evidence and could reverse the court’s
conclusion about whether the petitioner qualified for a pension.
Hayburn petitioned the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania for his pension. The panel of judges refused to hear his case and
instead wrote to President Washington to explain that they believed the Pension
Act was invalid because it provided that the executive branch could reverse a
decision of the judicial branch. The court explained that “[s]uch revision and
control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial
power which is vested in the courts.”120 In August 1792, Attorney General
Edmund Randolph asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus
compelling the federal circuit court in Pennsylvania to act on Hayburn’s petition.
The Court did not issue a decision on the merits, however, but instead agreed to
hold the motion under advisement until the next term – apparently concerned
about offending Congress by declaring the law unconstitutional.121 As one legal
historian explained, the “justices clearly hoped that Congress would change the
Invalid Pension law before the Court actually issued an opinion on the mandamus
motion.”122
Congress did just that. A few days before the Court’s next term ended,
Congress passed “An Act to regulate Claims to Invalid Pensions” that amended
the procedures to be followed by petitioning veterans and eliminated the
constitutional problems.123 The Supreme Court never issued a decision on the
merits of the case, apparently viewing the amended law as mooting the issue and
requiring Hayburn to follow the amended procedure in order to receive his
pension.
Hayburn’s Case is an early example of the Court’s willingness to avoid
issuing a decision while awaiting Congressional legislation that would obviate
the need to address the constitutionality of a piece of legislation. It also
demonstrates Congress’s ability to amend statutes that are raising problems for
courts in pending cases. As described further below, Congress and the Court
have continued to work together to resolve issues in statutes without either
branch expressing concern that the other has overstepped its constitutional
bounds.
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b. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly.124
Sholly provides a more recent example of a case in which the Court
purposely postponed a decision while awaiting an amendment to the legislation
at issue in the case. Respondents opposed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
determination that the Atomic Energy Act permitted it to approve an amendment
to the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor’s operating license without a hearing,
and the court of appeals had agreed that the Commission lacked the authority to
do so. The Commission sought review in the Supreme Court, and at the same
time proposed to Congress legislation authorizing the Commission to amend a
license without a hearing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 26,
1981,125 but twice postponed oral argument to give Congress the opportunity to
consider the legislation.126 Finally, in January of 1983, Congress enacted the
Commission’s proposed legislation and the Supreme Court remanded the case so
that the lower court could consider whether it was now moot.
Sholly demonstrates the benefits of judicial-legislative cooperation to
resolve a dispute over unclear legislation. The Court must have believed that the
issue would be better addressed by Congress in the first instance, which is why it
postponed issuing a decision to await forthcoming legislation. Indeed, had the
Supreme Court gone ahead and decided the case in favor of respondents, and had
Congress then amended the legislation shortly thereafter, the entire judicial
process would have been an unnecessary waste. With the new legislation in
place, the Commission would have been free to amend the license without a
hearing, just as it had attempted to do earlier. Of course, if the Supreme Court
had decided the case in favor of the Commission, then the legislation would have
been unnecessary. But the Court (and possibly also Congress) appears to have
believed that it would be better for this determination to be made through a clear
legislative directive rather than a judicial construction of an ambiguous statutory
provision.
c. Additional Recent Cases.
In a host of other cases Congress has amended legislation after the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari but before it has issued its ruling. The legislative
history reveals that Congress was aware that the Supreme Court was on the verge
of deciding a case regarding statutory meaning and that it sought to resolve the
issue before the Court did.
United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms v. Galioto127 concerned an equal protection challenge to a statute
prohibiting firearms sales to anyone adjudicated a mental defective or committed
to a mental institution, but permitting such sales to convicted felons. The lower
court struck down the statute after concluding that there was no rational basis for
the distinction.128 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the appeal
on November 4, 1985, and the case was argued on March 26, 1986. Meanwhile,
Congress redrafted the legislation so that felons and the mentally ill were treated
alike, and the House Report accompanying the legislation noted that this
amendment should resolve the issue in the pending Supreme Court case.129 In its
124
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subsequent opinion a month later, the Court commented that this “enactment
significantly alters the posture of this case,” and concluded that the case was now
moot.130
Department of Justice v. Provenzano131 questioned whether the Privacy Act
of 1974 qualified as an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act and thus
permitted withholding information from the public. The Third and Seventh
Circuits had issued conflicting decisions, and on April 2, 1984, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.132 On October
15, 1984, the President signed into law an amendment to the Privacy Act stating:
“No agency shall rely on an exemption in this section to withhold from an
individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under [the
Freedom of Information Act].”133 The House Report commented on the pending
Supreme Court case and stated that “[w]hatever ambiguity exists will be removed
by this change in the Privacy Act.”134 The parties agreed that this amendment
mooted their dispute, and the cases were remanded for final resolution under the
new legal standard.
United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Commission135 concerned the
application of 18 U.S.C. § 1304, a federal statute that prohibited radio stations
from broadcasting information about lotteries. Jersey Cape, a radio station, had
sued for declaratory relief arguing that section 1304 should not apply to the
broadcast of a winning number in a lawful state-run lottery such as the one
conducted in New Jersey.
The Third Circuit reversed the Federal
Communications Commission and ruled that section 1304 did not prohibit
broadcast of lawful state lottery results. This decision conflicted with an earlier
Second Circuit ruling, leading to the Supreme Court’s decision to review the
case.
The failure of the Gun Control Act to provide a procedure for relief of former
mental patients resulted in a challenge to the validity of th[e] disqualification
for mental patients that was upheld by the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, and which is now on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.
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After the case had been briefed and argued, Congress, aware of the Supreme
Court case, passed a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1307, which stated that “[t]he
provisions of section . . . 1304 shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes,
or information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under authority
of State law.”136 The Court noted the change in the law and remanded the case to
the court of appeals to determine whether the case was moot.137
Conclusion
These cases demonstrate that Congress has the institutional capacity to
resolve statutory ambiguity after the Supreme Court has granted certiorari but
before the Court has an opportunity to rule on the question. Just as interesting,
the Court appears to welcome Congress’s efforts to moot pending cases by
clarifying the legislation at issue. As Lindquist and Yalof’s study reveals,
Congress also takes notice of judicial confusion in the lower courts and seeks to
resolve such conflicts by clarifying legislation. Congress may step in because it
wants to assist courts in applying unclear statutes, or, more likely, because it
wants to wrest control of statutory meaning from the judiciary. Whatever its
reasons, Congress is already responding to judicial confusion through
amendments that affect results in pending cases, albeit in an inconsistent and ad
hoc fashion, which suggests that we should give serious consideration to the idea
of establishing a more structured and formalized process by which courts refer
hard questions about statutory meaning to Congress.
Admittedly, however, there is a darker side to this legislative practice of
amending legislation to affect results in pending cases. During some of the most
unstable periods of American history, Congress has passed legislation seeking to
ensure that it would obtain the judicial outcomes it desired. In Ex parte
McCardle138, for example, Congress enacted legislation stripping the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction to hear McCardle’s habeas corpus petition just a few days
after the case was argued in the Supreme Court. McCardle was challenging the
constitutionality of provisions of the Military Reconstruction Act– a challenge
that Congress had reason to think the Court might decide in McCardle’s favor –
and so Congress sought to prevent the Court from hearing and deciding the
issue.139 The Court agreed it no longer had jurisdiction over the case as a result
of the legislation, but its acquiescence has been viewed as troubling. The Court
did not permit Congress to control the results in United States v. Klein140, a case
136
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from the same post-Civil War period in which Congress sought to prevent the
Court from awarding compensation for the Union’s seizure of property during
that war. Congress was unhappy with the Court’s previous decisions granting
compensation, and so it enacted legislation attempting to force the Court to reach
a different result in Klein’s case. This time, the Court refused to defer to
Congress, although the constitutional grounds for its refusal to do so have
remained unclear.141
The legislation enacted on the eve of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
McCardle and Klein was not intended to clarify statutory ambiguity or eliminate
constitutional problems in legislation, but instead sought to strip the Court of
power to decide these cases in ways that Congress did not like. These attempts
by Congress to aggrandize itself at the expense of the judiciary can be
distinguished from cases such as Hayburn’s Case or Sholly in which Congress
enacted legislation intended to assist courts with statutory construction.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that Congress’s power to affect the
results in pending cases gives Congress the ability both to aid courts and to
undermine their authority. Any certification procedure must take into account
the troubling possibility that Congress might misuse an enhanced ability to affect
results in pending cases.
III. Structuring Certification to Satisfy Constitutional Restraints on the
Roles of Courts and Congress.
Before discussing the normative implications of encouraging courts to
certify questions about statutory meaning to Congress, the first question to be
answered is whether such a practice would be constitutionally permissible.
Judicial referrals to Congress raise significant separation of powers concerns.
The formalist view of separation of powers requires that each branch perform its
assigned tasks with rigid independence from the others.142 Functionalist theories
are more flexible, conceding that the branches may engage in activities outside of
their narrow, constitutionally assigned tasks, but only so long as they do not
diminish the constitutional stature of another branch by taking over its essential
functions.143 Under either view, a process by which courts stay cases and refer
specific questions about those cases to Congress for resolution comes
dangerously close to impermissibly mixing the legislative and judicial
functions.144 The discussion below seeks to show that judicial referrals to
Congress can avoid running afoul of constitutional limitations as long as referrals
are structured so that neither the court nor the legislature crosses boundaries that
delineate the judicial from the legislative power.
141
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From the very beginning of the Union, courts have concluded that they are
compelled to apply the law as it exists at the time of the decision, even if that law
has recently been altered by Congress.145 Accordingly, even without any formal
certification system in place, it is clear that Congress may amend legislation to
resolve a dispute pending before a court – indeed, as just discussed, Congress has
often done so.146 This long tradition demonstrates that legislation intended to
resolve pending court cases is not, per se, unconstitutional. The only question,
then, is whether a formal certification process under which courts encourage
Congress to pass such legislation transforms a constitutionally permissible
practice into an impermissible one. This article concludes that certifying
questions to Congress does have constitutional implications that must be
addressed in the structure of the certification process. As long as these limits are
in place, however, judicial referrals to Congress do not overstep constitutional
boundaries. Below is a description of the constitutional concerns raised by
certification of questions from courts to Congress, and then a discussion of the
ways in which the process can be shaped to fit within constitutional parameters.
A. Judicial Communication with Congress.
A certification process would require judges to communicate with the
legislative branch about pending cases. Communication between the judiciary
and the other branches of government is not by itself unusual or suspect; indeed,
it happens all the time.147 Federal judges frequently appear before Congress to
answer questions about their work and discuss the need for funding, staff, and
other resources. And judges regularly communicate with the executive branch
during litigation. The Supreme Court will seek the Solicitor General’s views on
the merits of petitions for writs of certiorari, and federal judges are required by
statute to inform the U.S. Attorney General or the relevant state attorney general
whenever they are asked to decide a case challenging the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress or a state statute. Courts must “certify such fact” to the requisite
executive officer and then must allow the executive to intervene and participate
as a party in the case.148 Permitting judges similarly to communicate with
Congress during pending cases would therefore not appear to present any
particular constitutional problem.
Constitutional questions would arise, however, were Congress to require
judicial consultation during pending cases, because then Congress would come
dangerously close to inserting itself into the judicial process and taking over the
judicial power to decide “cases” and “controversies.” Accordingly, the impetus
145
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for referrals must come from the courts, not Congress. Congress would be
walking very close to the constitutional line were it to enact legislation requiring
courts to abstain from deciding questions before consulting Congress in any
category of cases. Likewise, judges cannot order Congress to respond to their
questions about statutory meaning. A recognized attribute of the legislative
power is the “exercise [of] discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed,”149 and, consequently, courts cannot dictate the legislative agenda by
demanding Congress clarify statutes in response to judicial questions.
A formal procedure of certifying questions to Congress need not go so far,
however. To ensure its constitutionality, both branches should be permitted to
take part only if and when they choose to do so. As a result, even if a
certification process was formally created, such as through a rule of procedure or
through a legislative enactment, courts might choose not to use the procedure
and, even if they did, Congress might choose not to respond. This flexibility
would be essential to ensuring the procedure did not improperly intrude into
either branch’s constitutionally-assigned realm.
B. The Form of Congress’s Response.
If Congress did choose to respond to a judicial inquiry into the meaning of
an ambiguous statute, what form must that response take? Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,150 makes clear that Congress can “clarify”
statutory meaning only in accordance with the bicameral passage and presidential
presentment requirements of Article I. As the Supreme Court declared in
Chadha, “[t]hese provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional
design for the separation of powers” and cannot be compromised.151 In short,
Congress must enact a new law if it wishes to clarify the meaning of an existing
one.
Of course, individual members of Congress would be free to issue
statements proclaiming their own understanding of the meaning of the statutory
language at issue in a pending case. And Congress as a whole could pass a nonbinding resolution on the question. But a court can give such statements no more
weight than it gives to any other post-enactment legislative history – that is,
virtually none at all.152 Unless Congress actually amends the law at issue, the
court has received no congressional guidance as to the meaning of the statute and
should go ahead and decide the case on its own.
In essence, then, a judicial referral is not seeking the current Congress’s
interpretation of a previously enacted statute, but instead is enlisting the current
Congress’s help by asking it to revise a poorly drafted statute. Congress is not
bound to clarify the statute to accord with what it thinks the original enacting
Congress would have wanted. Just as Congress is always free to change laws by
amendment, the Congress that receives a judicial referral may choose to radically
alter, rather than to clarify, the statute at issue.
Some might argue that this process gives the current legislature too much
control over the meaning of legislation, and does so at the expense of the wishes
149
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of the enacting legislature. Although Congress always has the power to amend
legislation, Congress is busy and has limited resources, and so more often than
not would leave even problematic legislation in place.153 But if Congress is
notified by the courts of a legislative ambiguity and then given a limited window
of time in which to fix the problem so as to affect the results in pending cases,
Congress is more likely to take action. The influence of the enacting Congress
will be diminished, while the Congress in power at the time of a judicial decision
will have a greater say in the meaning of the legislation.
One response to this concern is that the enacting legislature retains all of its
power over the meaning of its legislation as long as it speaks clearly in the first
instance. It is only when the enacting legislature passes unclear statutes that
courts could certify questions to be resolved by the current Congress. Moreover,
even without a certification procedure in place, an enacting legislature risks
frustration of its purpose when it fails to speak clearly in a statutory text – the
only difference being that it is judges with cases before them, rather than the
current Congress, who determine the statute’s meaning. Furthermore, although
judges purport to resolve statutory ambiguity with reference to the enacting
legislature’s preferences, legal scholars have observed that judges frequently
interpret statutes in light of current political preferences – perhaps out of a desire
to avoid congressional overrides, or perhaps because judges are not as insulated
from political pressures as their lifetime appointments might suggest.154 And
maybe this is for the best. Professor Elhauge has suggested that each legislature
would prefer that courts apply statutes in accord with the current legislature’s
preferences rather than those of the enacting legislature, reasoning that “[a]s a
general matter, political preferences for a given statutory result are likely to be
stronger in the present because those who hold those preferences (and elect the
government) are those who experience that result.”155 As Elhauge notes, the
political preferences of those very same politicians (and electors) might have
changed by the time the statute is being construed years in the future, and thus
the enacting legislature might not even wish a court to interpret its legislative acts
as it would have originally intended.156
Elhauge’s critics question how courts are to “divine” current legislative
preferences. As Professor Amanda Tyler has noted in her trenchant critique,
“sources for ascertaining such [legislative] preferences are limited and we deal
by definition with an area in which the current legislature has not acted (at least
not in any formal way).”157 More often than not, the current Congress will not
have given the legislative question before a court any thought at all. Do we
really think that members of Congress spend their time pondering the statute of
limitations for retaliation claims in the False Claims Act, for example? If
Congress has not even thought about the issue – as will often by the case when
courts address minor technical questions about a statute’s application – then there
will simply be no legislative preference for courts to discover.158 Tyler also
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raises as a concern the merging of legislative and judicial functions that would
likely occur were courts seriously to attempt to “track[] current political
maneuvering” and monitor the “ebbs and flows of the legislative process” in an
effort to guess Congress’s preferences regarding a statute’s interpretation.159 She
cites these problems as serious flaws in Elhauge’s proposal.
Certifying questions to Congress avoids those problems by requiring the
current legislature to enact its preferences if it wishes to assist courts in applying
ambiguous statutes. Courts will not be second-guessing Congress based on the
statements in committee reports attached to bills that never become law, as
Elhauge suggests, but will instead be applying statutory text directly addressing
the problem in the case at hand. At the same time, certification realizes
Elhauge’s primary goal of incorporating the current legislature’s preferences into
the meaning of unclear statutes. It does so by alerting Congress to the problem
and giving Congress time (through abstention) and an incentive (in the form of a
pending case in which the meaning of the statute must be resolved) to take
action.
C. The Substance of Congress’s Response
The fact that Congress may pass an amendment that changes the meaning of
a law, rather than merely clarifies an ambiguity, raises a more troubling concern:
Congress may use the referral process to control the outcome in a specific case,
arguably usurping the judicial power to resolve cases and controversies.160
The constitutional structure that separates judging from legislating impliedly
forbids this type of legislation. As Chief Justice John Marshall declared: “It is
the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules would seem to be the duty
of other departments.”161 Moreover, specific constitutional provisions, such as
the Bills of Attainder,162 Equal Protection,163 Due Process,164 and Ex Post Facto165
Clauses all seek to protect individuals from this type of targeted legislation. In
Federalist Number 47, Madison explained that under the U.S. Constitution the
“legislature can perform no judiciary act,” and he quoted Montesquieu’s
declaration that “‘[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.’”166 In sum, as
Professor Martin Redish put it, Congress “may not, through legislation, dictate
the resolution of individual litigation.”167
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At least three separation of powers values are implicated by legislation
targeting specific cases. First, dividing judging from legislating protects the
litigants by ensuring that laws are applied by politically-insulated judges through
safeguards that accompany the judicial process, such as notice and an opportunity
to be heard.168 When Congress enacts legislation affecting large categories of the
population, it has incentives to draft laws that are just and reasonable; conversely,
when its laws single out only a very narrow category of people or cases,
Congress is unrestrained by political pressures and, of course, need not adhere to
the structures of adjudication. To the contrary, the pressures to please the
majority may push Congress to target individuals for disfavored treatment. As
Justice Powell observed: “Congress is most accountable politically when it
prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific
persons, those rights are subject to ‘the tyranny of a shifting majority.’”169
A second, and related, concern is that Congress can often avoid being held
accountable for legislation favoring individuals and small groups. Although
retroactive legislation is often feared because of its potential to target individuals
for punishment, it can just as easily be used to provide benefits to the
influential.170 For example, Congress has a history of inserting last-minute riders
in appropriations bills that command the outcome in a specific case
“notwithstanding” the statutes governing that area of law.171 These case-specific
amendments to legislation enable Congress to target individuals for special
treatment without taking the political heat that would accompany passage of a
law enacted after hearings and a committee vote.172
Third, by enacting case-specific legislation, Congress usurps the judiciary’s
power. The Framers were generally concerned that one branch of government
might seek to aggrandize its own power at the expense of the others, and in
particular worried that the legislature – whose “powers” are “at once more
extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits” – would encroach on the
functions of the other two branches.173 When Congress legislates to control the
outcome of the particular case, it appears to be doing just that.
Despite these constitutional concerns, there is no clear precedent forbidding
Congress from legislating for the individual case. Strands of reasoning from the
few cases to address this problem do strongly suggest, however, that Congress is
walking on constitutional thin ice when it passes legislation targeting specific
168
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pending cases. In addition, various constitutional provisions prohibit Congress
from singling out individuals for legislative penalties.
1. Limits on Congress’s Power to Control the Outcome in Individual
Cases.
The Court’s decision in United States v. Klein174 came closest to establishing
that Congress cannot enact legislation to control the results in specific cases. The
case arose from the turmoil of the post-Civil War period. Klein, administrator of
the estate of V.F. Wilson, sued the United States in the Court of Claims pursuant
to the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 3, 1863, which permitted
the owner of property seized during the Civil War to receive compensation for
the loss of property “on proof to the satisfaction of [the Court of Claims] . . . that
he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.”175 President
Lincoln had proclaimed that “certain persons who had been engaged in the
rebellion” would be pardoned and have their property restored to them upon
taking an oath of allegiance to the Union, and Wilson had taken this oath.176 The
Court of Claims ruled that Wilson’s pardon entitled his estate to compensation
under the statute, and the government then appealed that decision to the Supreme
Court.177
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court heard an appeal in Padelford v.
United States178 concerning a similarly-situated claimant. The Supreme Court
agreed with the Court of Claims that the presidential pardon entitled Padelford to
the proceeds of his property. In response, Congress enacted a law providing that:
1) a Presidential pardon would not be admissible evidence in favor of a claimant
seeking compensation under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act; 2) the
Supreme Court was to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction any appeal from a
judgment of the Court of Claims in which the claimant established his loyalty
through a pardon; and 3) the Court of Claims was to consider evidence that the
claimant had received a pardon as “conclusive evidence that such person did take
part in, and give aid and comfort to, the late rebellion,” and to dismiss any
lawsuit on a claimant’s behalf for lack of jurisdiction.179
In a wide-ranging opinion, the Court struck down the new law. The Court
articulated several grounds for its holding, and so it is impossible to know which,
if any, would have been decisive alone. Most relevant here is the strand of the
Court’s opinion establishing that Congress cannot “prescribe rules of decision to
the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.”180 By
stripping the Court of jurisdiction over any case in which a pardon was granted,
and ordering that a pardon be considered evidence supporting a conclusion
contrary to the one the Court had previously reached, Congress was seeking to
control the outcome of a pending case and thus had “passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power.”181 In a recent discussion of
Klein’s holding, the Court again emphasized that a key problem with the
legislation was Congress’s attempt to lay down rules to control the outcome of a
174
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case currently before the Supreme Court (and, not incidentally, to obtain an
outcome in the government’s favor).182
Although Klein declares that there are constitutional limits on Congress’s
ability to legislate to control results in individual cases, the opinion was muddled,
came at a particularly tense moment in congressional-judicial relations, and its
conclusion has rarely been revisited. It is thus only shaky precedent to support
the conclusion that Congress is not permitted to enact legislation seeking to
control the outcome in a pending case.183
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society184 provides the most recent guidepost
in this area.185 Environmental groups and companies in the timber industry had
182

United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
Moreover, Klein is at least in some tension with the Court’s earlier decision in
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855),
which Klein nonetheless declared was still good law. In Wheeling Bridge, the Court
declared that a bridge too low for certain boats to pass under was a nuisance and issued
an injunction requiring its removal. Congress subsequently passed a law legalizing the
structure and making it a post-road. The Court then held that the bridge had ceased to be
a nuisance as a result of the new legislation.
Klein sought to distinguish Wheeling Bridge on the ground that in the latter case
Congress had actually changed the circumstances to which the law should apply, while in
the former nothing had changed and Congress was simply trying to force the Court to
draw different conclusions from the evidence than the Court would have on its own. But
at the very least Wheeling Bridge suggests that congressional efforts to control results in
specific cases are not per se unconstitutional.
184
503 U.S. 429 (1992)
185
The most recent and well-known example of targeted legislation was inspired by the
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have wanted to continue living in such a state and ordered that her nutrition and hydration
be discontinued. Schiavo’s parents were strongly opposed to the order, which they
believed reflected the wishes of Schiavo’s husband but not Schiavo herself.
The U.S. Congress responded to the state court order by passing an Act, signed into
law at approximately 1 am on March 21, 2005, entitled, “An Act for the relief of the
parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.” P.L. 109-3. The law was explicitly limited in
application to Schiavo. It ordered the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida to “hear determine, and render judgment” on any claim of “alleged violation of
any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States
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declared that the new law “shall not be construed to create substantive rights not
otherwise secured by the Constitution and the law of the United States or of the several
States” and did not “constitute a precedent with respect to future legislation.”
Schiavo’s parents immediately filed a complaint and motion for a temporary
restraining order. Most of the federal judges asked to address the motion simply assumed
the constitutionality of the legislation and denied the motion on other grounds. One
exception was Judge Birch, of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, who
concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc to declare that the law violated separation of
powers because Congress “arrogat[ed] vital judicial functions to itself.” Although he
focused his arguments on the law’s alteration of the standard of review and abrogation of
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challenged the government’s regulation of harvesting and sale of timber in oldgrowth forests in the Pacific Northwest, which were home to the endangered
northern spotted owl. The environmental groups argued that the regulation was
too lax, the timber industry that it was too restrictive. In response to the
litigation, Congress enacted the Northwest Timber Compromise, which
established new requirements for the Forest Service’s management of the forests
at issue – requirements that (supposedly) represented a compromise position
between the demands of the environmental groups and the loggers. The law then
provided that compliance with these new statutory requirements would be
considered “adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory
requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases,” and cited the names
and docket numbers of both cases.186 Loggers argued that the new law mooted
the pending cases, while environmental groups challenged it on separation of
powers grounds.
The Ninth Circuit was troubled by the law’s specificity, and particularly its
attempt to control the outcome of the explicitly-referenced pending cases. Citing
to Klein, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Northwest Timber Compromise
crossed the constitutional line between legislation and adjudication. According
to the Ninth Circuit, the “critical distinction” is “between the actual repeal or
amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissible, and the
actual direction of a particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending
the law underlying the litigation, which is not permissible.”187 Because the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Congress had done the latter, it invalidated the law.
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s description of the effect of
the Northwest Timber Compromise, finding that Congress had changed the
underlying legal standard.188 The Supreme Court thus had no occasion to address
the correctness of the “critical distinction” that the Ninth Circuit drew from
Klein. Although that ultimate question was postponed, the decision demonstrates
that Congress can enact legislation limited to explicitly identified pending cases
and yet the Court will conclude that it did not cross the line into exclusive
judicial territory.
Also left unresolved was the issue raised in the case by Public Citizen, a
nonprofit public interest group acting as amicus curiae. Public Citizen contended
that even if the law did change underlying legal standards, it might still be
unconstitutional “if the change [in law] swept no more broadly, or little more
broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases.”189 That is,
the rules of exhaustion and abstention, his real concern seemed to be that Congress
changed the rules for a single individual. He concluded by stating that “because the Act
applies to only this case it lacks the generality and prospectivity of legislation that
comports with the basic tenets of the separation of powers.”
Judges Tjoflat and Wilson dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. The
dissenters argued that Congress had the constitutional power to change the standard of
review and other procedural rules: “Congress has prescribed a particular approach to a
particular problem in the general domain of federal jurisdiction, without presuming to
dictate – in any respect – our performance of a court’s essential function: ‘to say what
the law is.’”
186
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Public Citizen argued that Congress oversteps its bounds when it enacts
legislation targeting a few cases, even if that legislation purports to change
underlying legal standards. The Supreme Court specifically noted this objection
in its opinion, but did not address it on the ground that it had not been raised
below.190
The unanswered Public Citizen objection in Robertson goes to the heart of
constitutional concerns raised by the process of certifying questions to Congress.
Normally, the legislature enacts general rules that affect large classes of the
population, while courts apply those general rules to individual cases.191 If
Congress responds to a judicial referral by seeking to control the outcome in a
pending case, it might well cross the constitutional line that separates legislating
from judging, as well as violate constitutional principles intended to prevent the
abuses that can occur when the power to legislate targets individuals. Klein and
its progeny address the separation of powers concerns and suggest that there are
constitutional limits on Congress’s power to legislate for specific cases, but leave
the exact parameters of Congress’s authority unclear.
Under the law as it stands today, Congress has the ability to enact laws
targeting pending cases, and courts have the obligation to review those laws to
determine whether Congress has strayed too far into judicial territory. Permitting
courts to refer questions to Congress admittedly provides more opportunities for
Congress to misuse its power, but it does not change any fundamental aspect of
the legislative process to give Congress more leeway to do so. If Congress were
to respond to certified questions by seeking to control the outcome of specific
pending cases rather than to amend the legislation generally, the Supreme Court
could revisit the parameters of Congress’s power to do so and perhaps more
clearly define those limits for Congress and the lower courts
2. Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Targeted Legislation
In addition to the general restrictions on Congress dictated by separation of
powers principles, specific constitutional provisions such as the Bill of Attainder,
Ex Post Facto, and Equal Protections Clauses prohibit Congress from singling
out individuals for disfavored treatment in a pending case.192 These provisions
serve as an additional bulwark against targeted legislation, and they provide
another source of authority under which courts can strike down such legislation.
Because their application is narrow, however, they would likely have only a
minimal role in policing congressional responses to judicial referrals.
a. The Constitution specifically prohibits Congress and the states from
passing a bill of attainder,193 defined as “a law that legislatively determines guilt
and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the
protections of a judicial trial.”194 This provision, along with the Ex Post Facto
clause, serves to protect individuals from the misuse of legislative power and is
often cited in support of the separation of powers principle that Congress should
190
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not stand as judge in individual cases.195 As the Supreme Court declared in
United States v. Brown, the “Bill of Attainder Clause was intended . . . as an
implementation of the separation of power, a general safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply – trial by
legislature.”196
The Supreme Court has interpreted these prohibitions narrowly, however.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,197 the Court addressed former
President Nixon’s bill of attainder challenge to the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act. Although the Act applied only to Nixon, establishing
special burdens that only he had to bear, the Court upheld it because “the mere
specificity of law does not call into play the Bill of Attainder Clause.” The
special circumstances of the storage of Nixon’s presidential papers justified
Congress’s creation of a “legitimate class of one,” and so the Act’s singling out
of Nixon for special treatment was not a violation of the Clause. Moreover, even
if the Act’s specificity had triggered the Bill of Attainder Clause’s application,
the Court concluded that Congress had not “inflicted punishment” on Nixon
simply by burdening him with obligations under the Act.198
The Court contrasted the Act at issue in Nixon with the one struck down in
United States v. Lovett, where a House Report expressly characterized the named
individuals as “‘subversive . . . and. . . unfit . . . to continue in Government
employment.’”199 Although a formal legislative condemnation of specific people
is not a prerequisite to finding a law an unconstitutional bill of attainder, there
must be some evidence of legislative intent to penalize the individual affected.
The Court concluded that such evidence of legislative malice went to the heart of
the Constitution’s bill of attainder prohibition, which arose from “the fear that the
legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it
expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge or, worse still, lynch mob.”200
As Nixon and Lovett demonstrate, only in fairly extreme circumstances will
laws be struck down as unconstitutional bills of attainder. Even legislation that
imposes special burdens on named individuals will not be invalidated unless
there is evidence of a clear congressional intent to judge and punish.
Accordingly, even though the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as some measure of
protection against targeted legislation, it applies only in fairly extreme cases of
congressional malice toward an identified few.
b. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress from enacting laws that
retroactively impose punishment by changing the criminal legal consequences of
195
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completed acts.201 “Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is . . . the
lack of fair notice and government restraint when the legislature increases
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.”202
Like the Bill of Attainder Clause, it applies only to laws that penalize, and
prevents legislatures from criminalizing previously innocent acts.203
Retroactive changes to procedures at criminal trials, or to civil penalties, are not
violations of this limitation on Congress’s power to legislate. So, for example,
the Court held that the Clause did not bar a state from passing legislation civilly
committing sex offenders who had completed their prison sentences.204
c. The equal protection clause also prohibits Congress from targeting
individuals for disfavored treatment. A legislative classification will be upheld
as long as it is supported by some rational basis, but that basis cannot include an
animus toward one person, or even a small group of individuals. As the Supreme
Court declared, “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest.”205 Thus, the equal protection clause serves as a slightly broader textual
prohibition against legislation singling out specific individuals or groups for
special treatment.206
Conclusion
The trio of constitutional provisions discussed above seek to protect
individuals from becoming the targets of legislative penalties. But their scope is
narrow, and they are decisive only in the most extreme cases of legislative
animus. Perhaps they are most useful for the way in which they support and
establish the vague ideas discussed but not resolved in Klein – whatever it is
Congress is allowed to do, it must legislate broadly enough to avoid the charge
that it has sought to punish a specific few.
These limits provide some parameters that courts can use to police
Congress’s response to a certified question. If Congress seeks to control the
results in the pending case rather than clarify the law for all current and future
litigants, courts can disregard the legislation as either a violation of one of these
specific constitutional provisions, or more generally as an overstepping of
legislative authority and an impermissible intrusion into the judicial power to
decide specific cases.
D. Limits on Retroactive Legislation
If courts were permitted to certify questions to Congress, they would have to
grapple with the extent to which a congressional response to a certified question
would be applied retroactively to pending cases. One of the theories underlying
the proposal is that Congress is more likely to respond to a judicial inquiry about
statutory meaning when it knows it can change the result in all pending cases.
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Sometimes, this might require that Congress’s legislation be given retroactive
effect.
The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, together with the Due
Process Clause, suggest that there are constitutional limits on the retroactive
effect of legislation.207 “‘Retroactivity is not favored in the law,’” and thus the
default rule is that “‘congressional enactments and administrative rules will not
be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.’”208
The presumption against retroactivity is in tension, however, with the rule
established in Schooner Peggy that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time
it renders its decision.209 In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,210 the Supreme
Court attempted to reconcile these potentially conflicting doctrines. Landgraf
reaffirmed that congressional intent is the touchstone. If Congress makes clear it
wants legislation to be applied retroactively, then the Court is required to apply
the law to pending cases. If the statute contains no express statement about its
application, then the court must determine whether the statute has retroactive
effect – that is, “whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed.”211 Determining whether a law operates
retroactively is often a difficult question, and it requires that judges decide
whether there was fair notice, reliance on old law, or disruption of settled
expectations.212 If the law does have retroactive effect, then it should not be
applied to pending cases, but all other new legislation should – even in cases that
have been adjudicated in the lower courts under the old legal standards.
Ideally Congress would respond to a certified question by clearly specifying
if it wishes the clarifying legislation to be applied retroactively. Certified
questions from courts create an unusual situation, however, in which a court is
asking Congress to clarify an existing law to assist the court in deciding a
pending case. Accordingly, Congress has reason to presume that its response
will be applied retroactively, and any legislative amendment it enacts in response
is intended to have retroactive effect.
That was the conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court in
Western Security Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court.213 Shortly after that court had
granted review, the California Legislature passed legislation for the explicit
purpose of “’clarify[ing] the law’” at issue in the case and overturning the court
of appeal’s decision.214 The California Supreme Court then had to determine
whether the new legislation constituted a “substantial change in existing law,”
and, if so, whether the Legislature intended the statute to operate retroactively.215
That court concluded that the legislature’s statement that it intends an
amendment to “clarify” an existing law is equivalent to a statement that it intends
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the amendment to be given retroactive effect.216 Because statutes will be applied
retroactively upon a clear statement of legislative intent, every law explicitly
enacted to “clarify” existing law should be applied retroactively, whether or not
the court thinks it accurate to describe the amendment as a clarification.
Likewise, when a court stays a case and seeks congressional clarification of
ambiguous legislation, it would be reasonable to presume that Congress intends
its response to apply to that case and other cases – that is, to have retroactive
effect.217
In rare cases, constitutional limits will require that the court disregard even
an explicit instruction by Congress to apply a law retroactively. Retroactive
legislation may violate due process “if it is particularly harsh and oppressive,”218
and legislation that purports to free the government from previous contractual
commitments is particularly suspect. But the Due Process Clause forecloses
retroactive legislation only in the most extreme cases, for as the Court explained
in Landgraft, “the constitutional impediments to retroactive legislation are now
modest.” There are few constitutional hurdles, then, to incorporating Congress’s
response to a certified question into the resolution of pending cases.
Furthermore, it would be difficult for congressional clarification of an
ambiguous statute to disrupt settled expectations so as to implicate due process or
even to raise the fairness concerns that troubled the Court in Landgraf. If a
statute is so unclear that numerous courts have disagreed as to its meaning and
there truly is no way to determine what the original Congress intended, then
individuals had no reason to rely on one particular interpretation of the statute
over another. Could the plaintiff in Graham County have been counting on the
statute having a six-year statute of limitations when the statute itself was so
muddled on that question? Could the school board in Jackson have assumed that
it could retaliate against the basketball coach without fear that it would violate
Title IX, despite the conflicting precedent on that question? It is hard to imagine
any individual relying on an understanding of the law that neither the text nor
legal precedent clearly supports. In short, if the law is unclear enough to justify
certifying a question to Congress, it cannot have created the kind of reliance
interests that the presumption against retroactivity seeks to protect.
E. Judicial Authority to Abstain.
To give Congress a chance to respond, a court certifying a question about
the meaning of an ambiguous statute to Congress would need to stay the case in
which the question arose for some set period of time – perhaps for no more than
six months, with the possibility for extension if Congress appears to be on the
verge of taking action. This judicial abstention might be challenged on the
ground that courts have no constitutional authority to forgo the exercise of their
jurisdiction. Federal courts are obligated to resolve the cases or controversies
over which Congress grants them jurisdiction; they are not supposed to evade
that task by asking some other government institution to resolve cases for them.
Professor Martin Redish made that point in his article challenging the judicial
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practice of abstaining from deciding difficult questions of state law to allow state
courts to resolve the issue first.219 He argued that courts may not evade their
obligation to assume jurisdiction and decide cases simply because, in their view,
federalism and comity concerns make remand to state courts the wiser course of
action. Yet despite the strength of this criticism, courts continued to abstain
under the Pullman and Younger line of cases – even when it means depriving
litigants of the federal forum that Congress intended to provide.220
Certifying questions to Congress is no more an evasion of the judicial
obligation to hear and decide cases than abstaining to allow state court resolution
of questions of state law, and thus no more constitutionally objectionable. In any
case, the delay is considerably shorter than the average six-year delay in cases
remanded to state courts for resolution, and would be more akin to the delay
involved in certifying questions to state supreme courts. Although courts have an
obligation to hear the cases over which Congress grants them jurisdiction, they
are not required by statute or the Constitution to hear and resolve those cases
within any set period of time. A six month delay seems like a small price to pay
to definitively resolve a troubling issue of statutory interpretation. And, of
course, if Congress itself were to enact a law permitting courts to send it
questions in pending cases, then there could be no complaint that the court’s
staying of the litigation was in any way an evasion of its congressionally
mandated jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The discussion in this Part demonstrates that certifying questions to
Congress raises significant separation of powers concerns and could impinge on
individual rights protected by other constitutional provisions, yet also reveals that
these problems occur only at the margins, and that the Constitution does not
prohibit all judicial attempts to seek congressional input on pending cases.
Accordingly, certification must be structured to comply with constitutional
limitations. The guidelines below provide general principles for a certification
process that take into account these constitutional problems and seek to insulate it
from constitutional challenge:
1) Referrals must be discretionary: Courts must never be required to refer
cases, and Congress must never be required to respond.
2) To be given any legal weight, Congress’s response must be in the form
of law enacted in accordance with Article I’s bicameralism and presentment
requirements.
3) Congress must respond through broadly applicable legislation, rather than
by enacting a statute that seeks to control the result in only a handful of cases.
4) Congress should specify whether it wants the amended legislation to
apply retroactively to pending cases, although courts would probably be safe to
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assume that Congress intended any response to a referral to be applied
retroactively.
5) Congress should pass, and the president should sign, a law permitting
courts to certify questions to Congress so that when a court refers a case all three
branches of government have given the procedure their imprimatur.
If a certification process followed these broad principles, it should pass
constitutional muster. Whether adopting such a procedure would be a good
policy choice is a harder question to answer, however. Satisfying constitutional
minimums is a necessary prerequisite to adopting a certification procedure, but is
certainly not sufficient reason on its own to establish a formal structure through
which courts ask Congress to weigh in on pending cases. Moreover, even if
certification can be shaped to fit within constitutional parameters, it comes close
to certain constitutional lines that we might think better to give wide berth. Part
IV examines these normative questions and draws conclusion about the kinds of
cases in which certification would be a useful tool for courts, and those for which
the delays and the potential for abuse of the legislative process would outweigh
the benefits.
IV. Certifying Questions to Congress: A Policy Analysis.
The constitutional analysis in Part III suggests that certification is less
radical than it might first appear. Yet is it wise? A formal system by which
courts seek congressional input would give courts and Congress an opportunity
to communicate about the cases in which legislative assistance would be most
useful. But when courts stay cases and notify Congress that they are seeking
clarifying legislation, they push Congress to take a more active, and possibly
troubling, role in pending cases. If we are concerned that Congress may act
irresponsibly when faced with an unpopular litigant, or that Congress may not
enact its best legislation in the shadow of the facts of specific cases, then we may
question whether Congress should be given this opportunity.
This Part first discusses in greater detail the policy arguments for and
against establishing a procedure by which courts send questions to Congress,
using the three recent Supreme Court cases discussed in Part I – Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education, Graham County Soil & Water Conservation
District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, and Clark v. Martinez – to illustrate the
possibilities and pitfalls of sending questions about statutory meaning to
Congress. This Part then addresses the very real possibility that Congress would
often not respond to a court’s request for a clarification of legislative meaning.
Congressional silence need not be viewed as a failure of the certification process,
however, because Congress’s refusal to clarify legislation can be understood as
an implicit delegation to courts of the lawmaking authority that they otherwise
lack. If courts ask for Congress’s input and receive no answer, they can then
legitimately engage in lawmaking that they should otherwise avoid. This Part
concludes by identifying the types of hard cases in which judicial referrals would
assist judges grappling with the meaning of ambiguous statutes.
A. The Benefits of Certifying Questions to Congress.
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Improving Interbranch Communication
1.
Referrals would provide a new avenue of communication between courts
and Congress, and would do so in a manner likely to draw congressional
attention to problem statutes and generate legislation to resolve those problems.
Judges, members of Congress, and academics all agree that the judiciary and
Congress do not communicate well. As Judge James L. Buckley of the D.C.
Circuit commented: “It is self-evident that these two institutions will impact on
one another in a dozen different ways. Yet, for whatever strange reason, each
institution tends to be miserably unacquainted with the problems faced by the
other.”221 Judge Frank M. Coffin, when serving as Chair of the U.S. Judicial
Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, observed that “the judiciary and
Congress not only do not communicate with each other on their most basic
concerns; they do not know how they may properly do so.”222 Studies reveal that
neither members of Congress nor their staffs are cognizant of the great majority
of judicial decisions addressing legislation within the jurisdiction of their
committees.223
In the mid-1980s, Robert Katzmann – now a Second Circuit Judge, but at
that time head of a non-profit organization engaged in examining relations
between Congress and the Judiciary – began studying the interaction between the
D.C. Circuit and Congress, focusing on how Congress responded to D.C. Circuit
opinions discussing problems with statutory language.224 He examined twenty
cases in which the D.C. Circuit had issued opinions that commented on a
statutory gap, ambiguous language, a grammatical problem, or invited Congress
to deal with a substantive issue in the legislation. He then contacted staff
members at the relevant House committees and discovered that in most cases the
congressional staffs were unaware of the court’s decisions.225 Yet there is
general agreement that Congress would craft better statutes if judicial decisions
addressing legislative problems were brought to staff members’ attention.
Indeed, every staffer interviewed by Katzmann thought that they should be aware
of these judicial decisions so that they could consider whether statutory revisions
were necessary.226
Certifying questions to Congress in pending cases is likely to capture
Congress’s attention and perhaps even spur Congress to take immediate action to
improve problem legislation before a court issues a definitive decision on the
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issue. But even if Congress never responds to the judicial query, some
members of Congress and their staffs will be put on notice that a piece of
legislation is posing interpretive challenges. The communication from the court
will provide useful information to Congress about the issues courts grapple with
in interpreting and applying legislation, and may improve legislative drafting as a
result. At the very least, then, referrals will make Congress aware of the problem
of statutory gaps or ambiguities, enabling Congress to avoid repeating those
drafting errors in future legislation.227
Suppose, for example, that rather than issuing an opinion in Graham
County, the Supreme Court instead asked Congress to clarify the limitations
period for retaliation claims in the False Claims Act. The absence of a clear
statute of limitations appears to have been an oversight; when Congress amended
the False Claims Act to add retaliation it seems to have forgotten to establish a
limitations period to govern that claim. Nor is this the first time Congress has
failed to clarify the limitations periods in legislation establishing new causes of
action. Once the error was brought to Congress’s attention, it is possible that
Congress could act quickly to establish a limitations period to govern the dispute
in Graham County and all future cases. Even if Congress did not resolve the
question, forcing the Court to decide the case on its own, the certification might
alert Congress to the need to specify limitations periods when adding claims to
existing statutes in the future.
2.
Reducing Interbranch Conflict
Referring questions of statutory ambiguity to Congress has the potential to
reduce interbranch conflict. Courts are more easily accused of “legislating from
the bench” when they are filling gaps or finding meaning where, in truth, none
exists.228 Members of Congress are more likely to criticize courts when they see
judges interpreting ambiguous statutes in ways that they would not.229 The
tension between the judicial and legislative branches is at its zenith when a court
concludes that a statute is unconstitutional and strikes it down.
Some of these problems could be avoided if Congress clarified ambiguous
statutes in response to certified questions from courts, thereby obviating the need
for the court to engage in quasi-legislative activity. The more important the
question of statutory meaning, the more likely Congress is to take up the question
and resolve it for the court. Consequently, divisive questions of statutory
meaning – such as whether Congress intended to create an implied private right
of action or to allow for the indefinite detention of deportable aliens – would no
longer be subjects that the judiciary is forced to decide on its own.
Admittedly, courts might send questions to Congress that are so
controversial that Congress would prefer to punt the issue back to the judicial
branch. For example, members of Congress might not want to make a decision
about whether a retaliation claim can be brought under Title IX, or the length of
time an alien can be detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act, out of
fear of alienating some part of their constituencies. Conversely, some referrals
might concern minor or technical questions of statutory meaning – such as the
227
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limitations period under the False Claims Act – that Congress simply does not
have the time to address. But even when Congress does not respond to a judicial
inquiry, courts will forestall criticism by first seeking congressional input. If a
court asked Congress to resolve the issue and Congress never responded, then the
court cannot be blamed for filling in gaps or assigning meaning to unclear
language that Congress failed to fix. By making a good faith effort to obtain a
resolution of the problem through the political branches, the court will insulate
itself from attacks of activism.
Referrals to Congress would be particularly helpful in avoiding the
interbranch conflict that arises whenever the judiciary confronts an ambiguous
statute raising constitutional concerns. Because the court is being asked to strike
down legislation enacted by a co-equal branch of government, these cases pit the
judicial and legislative branches against one another. The courts’ current method
of dealing with this problem is to construe the language to avoid the
constitutional question230 – a practice that Alexander Bickel referred as one of the
“passive virtues” that encourages Congress to give a “second look” to problem
legislation.231 Only when Congress makes crystal clear its intent to push the
constitutional limits will courts have to address the question whether the statute is
unconstitutional, and perhaps take the ultimate step of striking down the
legislation. In other words, courts use this interpretative technique as a method
of side-stepping a clash with Congress.
Yet, as wasdiscussed in Part I, the constitutional avoidance doctrine itself
has been criticized as an example of judicial overreaching.232 Commentators
question whether courts have the right to refuse to apply statutes as they can most
logically be read without definitively deciding whether that construction would
be unconstitutional. By purposely skewing the meaning of statutes without first
addressing whether the more straightforward reading is unconstitutional, critics
contend that courts are essentially rewriting laws even when the Constitution
might not require it –something that courts have no authority to do.233
Sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress is a better method of
addressing ambiguous statutes that push constitutional limits. These certified
questions would give Congress the opportunity to decide whether it wishes to
tread near constitutional lines before the court rewrites the statute.234 Courts
would not have to distort the meaning of statutes to avoid a constitutional
problem that they might eventually conclude did not exist in any case. For its
part, Congress might wisely decide to amend the statute to avoid the
constitutional problems that concern the court, thereby circumventing a
constitutional showdown. Congress, not the courts, should be responsible for
“clarifying” statutory meaning to avoid constitutional issues – certifying
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questions about the meaning of ambiguous and constitutionally-suspect statutes
to Congress allows Congress to take on that role.
Were certification available, the Court could have granted the petition in
Clark v. Martinez – or, even better, in its precursor Zadvydas v. Davis – and then
stayed the case and asked Congress to establish a clear limit on the length of time
that aliens could be detained. Certification would have allowed the Court to
avoid the constitutional problem created by a statute that appeared to permit
indefinite detention. The judicial query would have notified Congress of the
ambiguity in the statute and at the same time alerted Congress of the Court’s
constitutional concerns. Congress might have reacted by enacting legislation that
clearly stated the permissible length of detention in most cases, clarified whether
that period applied to admitted and inadmissible aliens alike, and provided
grounds for extending detention under certain extraordinary circumstances.
Alternatively, if Congress had responded with legislation clearly permitting
indefinite detention, then the Court could have squarely addressed the
constitutional question presented by the statute.
As this example illustrates, certification puts the burden of avoiding the
constitutional showdown on Congress, not the courts. If Congress chooses to
force the question, then the Supreme Court would decide whether the statute
comports with the Constitution – a task for which the Court is well-suited.
Because certification was not an option in Zadvydas or Clark, however, the Court
grafted onto the Immigration and Nationality Act a six-month detention period
for both admitted and inadmissible aliens and made vague references to
circumstances that might justify extending that detention – all decisions that
seem better made by Congress in the first instance than by a court.
3.
Making the Best Use of Courts’ and Congress’s Institutional
Competences
Judicial referrals of ambiguous statutes to Congress would free courts from
filling gaps and reconciling inconsistencies in statutory language – functions that
the judiciary is comparatively less well-situated to perform than Congress.
Congress has the staff and the resources to investigate problems that need
legislative fixes, and then to deliberate about the best policy to be enacted into
law. Members of Congress represent constituencies with whom they remain in
close contact, and thus have a view of the interests and problems of those they
represent. Judges, on the other hand, cannot investigate policy choices because
they do not have the resources or authority to conduct hearings, nor do they have
a constituency to consult or to whom they are accountable. To the contrary, the
defining characteristics of the federal judiciary is that its members have life
tenure and salary protections that enable them to protect individual rights and
apply laws fairly and consistently to all members of the population, even when
doing so is politically unpopular. For all these reasons, Congress is the better
institution to draft laws, and the judiciary is the better institution to apply them.235
Yet when Congress enacts statutes that are unclear, or contain gaps or
inconsistencies, then courts are required to get into the business of making, rather
than interpreting, the law.236 For example, when the Supreme Court decides that
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Title IX creates a cause of action for retaliation (as it did in Jackson), or assigns a
state statute of limitations to claims brought under the False Claims Act (as it did
in Graham County), or determines how long deportable aliens may be detained
(as it did in Zadvydas and Clark), it is acting more like a legislature than a court.
Courts are unlikely to do as good a job as Congress could in making these policy
choices because they lack all the resources and information that Congress has as
its disposal. These cases force courts to go beyond interpretation, a task for
which they are well-suited, and engage in law-making, for which they are not.
Furthermore, Courts are accused of judicial activism when they make these
sorts of substantive policy decisions because their critics fail to recognize that
when statutes leave important questions unanswered – as did Title IX, the False
Claims Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act – courts have to reach some
conclusion about how the statute should be applied, and any decision forces
courts into the position of legislating rather than interpreting. In other words,
judges cannot avoid being activists when faced with ambiguous statutes that must
be applied to the case at hand. Instead of being criticized for making these hard
decisions, courts should be given the alternative of referring questions of
statutory ambiguity back to Congress so that Congress can assume the
lawmaking responsibility for which it, and not the judiciary, is best suited.
4.
Promoting Transparency
Certifying questions to Congress provides a more straightforward method of
dealing with statutory ambiguity than the hermeneutic theories and canons of
construction that courts normally employ. The latter techniques simply cannot
resolve every statutory interpretation problem.237 As discussed in Part I, there are
times when Congress has not foreseen the situation presented to the court, or
perhaps deliberately chosen to leave an issue unclear, and thus neither the
statutory text nor the legislative history can guide the court’s construction. In
such cases, courts generally make up an answer in the guise of “interpreting” the
statute, often bending or breaking traditional interpretive tools to do so.238 On
other occasions, courts will misuse these techniques to avoid constitutionally
troubling or obviously unfair outcomes. For the most part, judges are not fooling
anyone when they do so – indeed, judges are often accused of imposing their
own policy preferences while purporting to “interpret” statutes.239 Even those
who approve the results in such cases contend that courts are perverting
important tools of statutory construction by suggesting that the meanings they
arrive at are compelled by these interpretive techniques.
By sending an ambiguous statute to Congress for clarification, a court is
declaring that it can find no answer to the question in the case before it through
traditional hermeneutic inquiries, and that it thinks the issue is better addressed in
the first instance by the political branches. As a result, the canons of statutory
interpretation and other hermeneutic techniques will not be devalued by being
interpretation to law-creation is usually a matter of debate. See Daniel J. Meltzer,
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pressed into use in such cases, and the court will be more honest with itself, the
parties, the public, and Congress if it concedes the impossibility of the
interpretive task and asks Congress for assistance.
In Jackson, Graham County, and Clark, the majority and dissent reached the
opposite conclusions about meaning of the statutes at issue after engaging in a
careful parsing of the text, examination of legislative history, and application of
interpretive theories and canons of construction.240 A review of those decisions
leaves the reader unconvinced that there was any “answer” to be found using
those sources. A more honest approach would have been for the Court to throw
up its hands, declare the impossibility of the task, and seek congressional
assistance.
Moreover, the possibility of judicial certification may keep Congress more
honest and transparent when enacting legislation. Legislators sometimes
consciously choose ambiguity to mask their goals, or to be able to claim to
constituents that they accomplished something they did not, or to build majority
support for legislation that would otherwise fail to be enacted into law.241 When
courts are honest about ambiguity, they identify that the problem is the
legislature’s drafting of the original statute, rather than judicial failure to find and
apply politically neutral and effective techniques of statutory interpretation. By
bringing the problem back to Congress’s attention, legislators will either have to
face up to the hard choices required of them, or, through silence, concede that
they are unwilling to make legislation clear. In addition, the potential for
referrals back to Congress may inspire the legislature to be clearer in the first
instance – in part, because referrals will draw their attention to drafting problems
they will seek to avoid in the future, and in part because the enacting Congress
would rather retain control of the statute’s meaning than cede that task to
whichever future Congress receives the referral.
5. Promoting Democracy
Certifying questions about statutory meaning to Congress is more consistent
with democratic ideals than the current practice, which transforms judges into
legislators whenever Congress enacts ambiguous statutes. Instead of an
unelected judge simply drafting the missing language or altering the meaning of
words to undo an absurdity or inconsistency, elected members of Congress get to
take the first shot at clarifying statutory meaning.
Although Congress now has the option of overriding judicial interpretations
that it does not like – and, as Eskridge demonstrated,242 Congress sometimes
chooses that path – legislative overrides are not a failsafe method for ensuring
that elected branches have the last say about a law’s meaning. Congress might
not be able to override a judicial interpretation even when that interpretation is
contrary to the original intent of the enacting legislators and is disliked by the
majority of current legislators. As scholars of the legislative process have
explained, judicial decisions are hard to reverse because if even a small
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proportion of the original legislative coalition prefers the court’s reading of the
statute to the legislative agreement, and if those lost votes cannot be replaced
with legislators who were originally opposed to the statute, then the judicial
ruling will stand.243 The court’s opinion declaring the meaning of the statute will
change the default position and create new stakeholders who are happy with the
court’s view of the law, inhibiting the legislature’s ability to enact a statute to
reestablish the original understanding of the legislation.
For example, a majority of those members of Congress that supported
adding retaliation to the False Claims Act might have preferred a six year statute
of limitations for that claim. But the Court has now read the Act as containing no
statute of limitations for retaliation claims, and has thus indicated that the likely
statute of limitations to be applied would be the 3-year period provided by the
most closely analogous state law.244 Those members of Congress who were
opposed adding a retaliation claim will obviously prefer this shorter period, as
might some members who supported the addition of the retaliation claim but
preferred a shorter limitations period. Together, this new coalition could prevent
an amendment that would override the Court’s interpretation and establish a sixyear statute of limitations.
In contrast, when a court certifies questions about statutory meaning to
Congress, it encourages Congress to legislate before the court issues an opinion,
leading to statutes that are drafted as a majority of elected members of Congress
prefer rather than as unelected judges choose to interpret them. Congress will be
inspired to enact clarifying legislation because it knows that if it does not, the
court will be forced to decide the question for it. Because legislators cannot
know how a court would decide the case without their assistance, they will be
able to enact clarifying legislation free from a judicial interpretation that skews
legislative coalitions.
Certifying questions to Congress accomplishes many of the same goals
lauded by dynamic statutory theorists, who recommend interpreting ambiguous
statutes in light of current congressional preferences and social norms rather than
looking backward to glean the intent of the enacting legislature.245 Critics of this
school of interpretive thought claim that it poses an impossible task – however
are judges supposed to determine the preferences of legislators and/or the general
public? – and so they suggest that dynamic theorists are really just empowering
judges to craft new legislation in accord with their own policy preferences.246
Certifying questions to Congress realizes the dynamic theorists’ goals, but does
so in a way that should satisfy these critics. Courts would no longer be trying to
guess at current legislative preferences, but instead would be asking for a clear
statement from the current Congress about how the interpretive problem should
be resolved. If Congress does not respond, however, then Courts have a
newfound freedom through the implicit delegation of legislative power to engage
in lawmaking that would otherwise be Congress’s prerogative.247
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B. The Costs of Certifying Questions to Congress.
Certification does not come without costs. Certification will cause delays. It
may politicize the judicial process. It may produce ill-considered and hastily
drafted legislation, or legislation driven by base majority preferences or the
desire the please narrow interest groups. For these reasons, I advocate that only
the Supreme Court, and possibly also circuit courts acting en banc, be given the
authority to certify questions to Congress, and that these courts use this tool only
in cases of truly intractable statutory ambiguity where it appears that Congress
will do a better job of legislating a solution than can a court.
1. Delay
Without question, certification to Congress will delay resolution of cases in
which the procedure is used. If Congress does not respond to the referral, the
delay should be six months or less because the court should not abstain for any
longer if there is no indication that Congress intends to clarify the legislative
ambiguity. If a bill to amend the statute is proposed and starts working its way
through the committee process, however, then the delay could end up being two
years or more to allow for the kind of deliberation the legislative process often
demands.248 This additional time is significant, and rightfully a reason for courts
not to certify questions lightly.
But delay is not a reason to reject judicial referrals to Congress out of hand.
The use of abstention and certification seek state court views on state law also
slows down the judicial process – in the case of abstention, by an average of six
years249 – and yet the consensus is that the benefit of obtaining state court input
justifies the added time it takes to decide the case.250 The delay is considered
worthwhile because these procedural devices give the ultimate, authoritative
decision-maker the first chance to answer hard questions about statutory meaning
– potentially even saving time in the long run by avoiding the need for a state
court to override a federal court’s decision about state law. For the same reasons,
the delay caused by referring questions of statutory ambiguity to Congress is
justified. Better to have Congress make clear how it wants the statute to be
applied than leave a federal court to guess at the meaning in an unclear text, and
then be overridden by a dissatisfied Congress.
Even though a referral to Congress postpones the resolution of a single case,
referrals have the potential to increase the overall speed of judicial
decisionmaking. The referral may inspire Congress to enact a clarifying
amendment much earlier than it would have if left to address the issue on its own
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timetable. In law, certainty and finality are beneficial.251 The sooner Congress
clarifies an unclear statute, the more quickly and easily courts can resolve all
current and future cases concerning that issue. Indeed, some cases will never be
filed simply because there is no longer any debate about what the law means.252
So even though a decision in a specific case will be delayed, the legal system as a
whole will operate more efficiently.
Finally, Congress can find methods to reduce the time it takes to respond to
referrals about the most basic type of scrivener’s errors and similarly
uncontroversial clarifications to statutory text. Congress can expedite the
enactment of corrective legislation through procedures such as suspension of the
rules or proceeding under unanimous consent.253 Even without those special
procedures, one long-time judicial staff member explained that “when most
everyone [in Congress] agrees to do something, legislation can be passed in a
matter of days.”254
Because delays are a legitimate concern, however, only a limited number of
courts should have the power to certify questions to Congress, and they should
use that power only when presented with truly inscrutable statutes. Questions
about statutory meaning should not be sent to Congress unless there has been
significant judicial disagreement over the text at issue culminating in the kind of
deep circuit split that the Supreme Court itself requires before it will hear most
cases. I recommend that the authority to certify questions to Congress be limited
to the Supreme Court and perhaps also circuit courts acting en banc. A single
district court, or even a single panel of three appellate judges, should not have the
power to defer the resolution of disputes for the purpose of seeking congressional
input. With such limits in place, certification should be an infrequent occurrence,
and should arise only in the kinds of cases presenting intractable problems of
statutory interpretation in which the benefits of certification outweigh the costs.
2.
Politicizing the Judicial Process
As previously discussed, certifying questions about statutory meaning to
Congress is democracy-forcing because it provides an additional opportunity for
the members of the elected, politically-accountable branches of government to be
clear about the meaning of the laws they enact.255 The other side of the coin is
that transferring issues in pending cases to the halls of Congress will politicize
the judicial process. At least in theory – though admittedly not always in practice
– courts are the one forum in which the political power of the parties is irrelevant.
251

Cf. Friendly, supra note __, at 793 n.39 (noting that legislative amendments might
prove troublesome in pending cases, but concluding that “the need for ending the
uncertainty for the future normally transcends the possibility of adverse decision of cases
arising in the interim”).
252
Ginsburg & Huber, supra note __, at 1420 (“Because statutes sorely in need of more
definite statements are susceptible of diverse interpretations, they inspire litigation.”).
253
Nagle, supra note __, at 1281.
254
Interview with Robert Schiff, Chief Counsel for Senator Russ Feingold. Schiff cited
as an example Congressional legislation giving the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) the authority to issue the Do Not Call list, which passed within five days of the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma’s decision concluding that the FCC’s
did not have the power to issue and enforce a Do Not Call list. See An Act to Ratify the
Authority of the Federal Trade Commission to Establish a Do-Not-Call Registry, Pub. L.
108-82 (2003) (act was passed on September 29, 2003, five days after the decision in
U.S. Security v. F.T.C., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (W.D. Ok. 2003).
255
See supra notes __ to __.

52

Certifying Questions to Congress

But if a case is referred to the political branches for resolution, then the relative
political power of the parties comes back into play.256 One can reasonably
suspect that if a question of statutory ambiguity is sent to Congress, the party
with the most money, connections, and influence will be more likely to persuade
Congress to “clarify” the ambiguous statute in a way that favors that party and
their interests.257
A partial response to this criticism is that certification does not create a new
problem: Congress already can alter legislation to change the outcome of
pending cases, and, as a result, Congress is already heavily lobbied by those who
fear they might lose in court.258 Admittedly, an established process by which
courts send questions to Congress would give Congress more notice, opportunity,
and incentive to take action, and so it would likely increase the parties’
opportunities to apply political pressure to obtain the legislation that will allow
them to win their case. But these are not grounds for criticizing certification per
se, but rather are problems that infuse the process of democratic decisionmaking.
Certification is a more democratic way of resolving statutory ambiguity, and thus
it will be accompanied by all the downsides of the democratic process, including
lobbying by special interests.259
Indeed, certification could be considered a fairer method of notifying
Congress about problem legislation than the system we have now. Without
referrals to Congress, a politically powerful losing party has the incentive and
ability to get Congress to amend the legislation at issue, but losing parties
without political influence will very likely be unable to do so.260 In his study of
the factors leading to congressional overrides of judicial decisions, Eskridge
discovered that politically powerful losers in court are more likely to persuade
Congress to override Supreme Court decisions than those who lack access and
clout.261 Judicial referrals give Congress notice and an opportunity to take action
when a court decides that congressional input would be helpful, and not just
when one party has the political muscle to bring the issue to Congress’s attention.
Moreover, a closer look at the relative political power of the parties in
Jackson and Graham County provides some reassurance, because these cases
demonstrate that even a single plaintiff will be able to call upon influential allies
should the need to lobby Congress arise. Both cases were brought by a single,
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relatively powerless plaintiff against an institutional defendant, yet both plaintiffs
had plenty of amici supporting them who could be expected to join in the
lobbying effort should there need to be one.262 Nor were the defendants in either
case (a school board in Jackson and a local government and its officials in
Graham County) so powerful and connected as to suggest that they would
inevitably win the day in the halls of Congress – especially considering that the
United States in both cases supported the plaintiff. Clark, however, poses a more
worrisome problem, since it pitted an illegal alien against the executive branch of
the United States. The executive always has the inside track in Congress, and
particularly when the President’s party also controls both Houses of Congress, as
was the case when Clark was decided. We might fear the power of the executive
in a case like Clark to push through Congress a “clarification” that favors
executive power at the expense of the individual litigant – particularly when the
litigant is a politically powerless alien.
Courts should therefore be circumspect about the cases they refer to
Congress. If they believe that one party has much greater political clout that its
opponent, they should hesitate to send the question about statutory meaning to
Congress out of fear that Congress will attempt to control the outcome in the
particular case rather than legislate for the general public good. If the court is
concerned that one party will out-lobby the other, or that Congress will be
tempted to reward or punish the individual litigants in the case before the court,
then the court should choose not to certify the question in that case. In addition,
courts should police the congressional response to a certified question to ensure
that Congress has not sought to take over the judicial function by controlling
results in specific cases. As discussed in Part III, Congress must legislate so as to
affect more than just the case before the court, which means that Congress should
take into account the broader public interest rather than just the interests of the
parties in the pending litigation. To ensure this result, courts must be vigilant in
preventing Congress from encroaching on judicial territory by attempting to
control the outcome of a pending case without effecting a change in the
underlying legal standards.263
3.
Congress’s Failure to Respond
If a certification procedure were established, Congress would likely ignore
certified questions in a large number of cases, leaving the ambiguous statute to be
construed and applied by the court. The reality is that Congress has many
legislative priorities and may not be interested in expending time, resources, and
political will on a statute that a court finds confusing. Consequently, the
certification process may not accomplish the hoped-for goal of giving the elected
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branches an opportunity to clarify indeterminate statutes. Indeed, many of the
claimed benefits of certification described above would fail to materialize.
Yet even assuming Congress would not respond to most judicial queries, the
very fact that Congress was asked to clarify a statute but did not do so will have
bearing on the judicial approach to the interpretive problem. I contend that
Congress’s failure to assist the court implicitly delegates the lawmaking function
to the courts, permitting judges to approach the ambiguous statute with greater
flexibility and creativity and insulating them from charges of judicial activism
when doing so.
Others might object, arguing that congressional silence should not be
interpreted as giving courts free rein to engage in lawmaking. Legislative
inaction is weak evidence of congressional intent. When a court issues a decision
interpreting a statute and Congress never amends the statute to undo that court
decision, should we assume that Congress agrees with the court’s reading of the
legislation? What if Congress amends the statute but does not alter the judicial
construction? And how about if members of Congress drafted a bill seeking to
override the judicial construction, but the bill never becomes law? Courts have
been inconsistent in their treatment of these different types of legislative inaction,
sometimes treating congressional silence as a near-dispositive factor and other
times concluding it has no value whatsoever.264
The argument in favor of imbuing legislative inaction with legal
significance is that, at least in some cases, it raises a strong inference that
Congress approves of the judicial or executive branch’s statutory
interpretation.265 But as the Court has conceded, “[n]onaction by Congress is not
often a useful guide.”266 Courts frequently reject legislative acquiescence
arguments, noting that members of Congress are likely to be unaware of the
judicial or agency interpretation at issue.267 And even when Congress is
cognizant of another branch’s reading of a statute, its failure to override that
interpretation might be due to pressing legislative priorities rather than its
approval. As one commentator noted, “[legislative] [a]cquiescence is the rule
and not the exception, whatever Congress’ feelings about a Supreme Court
decision.”268 For these reasons, legal scholars have almost uniformly concluded
264

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67, 69 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction].
265
For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the
Court held that a statutory tax exemption for educational institutions was not available to
a school such as Bob Jones that discriminates on the basis of race. To support its
decision, the Court noted that Congress had never attempted to overturn a longstanding
IRS interpretation rejecting application of the exemption to discriminatory institutions.
Id. at 600. Although a number of bills had been introduced seeking to do just that, none
had made it into law, even though other amendments to the charitable exemption
provision had been enacted during that time. Moreover, Congress had overridden a
judicial decision by enacting an amendment denying tax-exempt status to social clubs
discriminating on the basis of race, which seemed to confirm Congress’s approval of the
IRS policy. Taken in context, congressional inaction in the face of the IRS’s policy to
deny the exempt status to discriminatory educational institutions was strong evidence that
Congress acquiesced in the IRS’s interpretation of the law.
266
461 U.S. at 600.
267
Id.
268
Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note __, at 107.

Certifying Questions to Congress

55

that acquiescence is not a good indicator of legislative agreement with anything a
court says.269
Reliance on legislative silence is also criticized as being at odds with the
democratic process. Lawmaking should be transparent and produce results for
which elected officials can be held accountable. Congressional acquiescence is a
nonevent that occurs without fanfare or press coverage, permitting legislators to
avoid responsibility because none will be on record as having voted for another
branch’s interpretation. Moreover, giving weight to legislative silence conflicts
with the constitutionally prescribed roles of the legislative and executive
branches in our system of government. Under Article I of the Constitution,
Congress plays the primary role in enacting legislation, but to do so it is required
to win approval of both Houses of Congress and the President (or override a
presidential veto by a two-thirds majority of both Houses). If a judicial or
agency interpretation of a statute is viewed as “law” simply because Congress did
not pass a statute rejecting that interpretation, then congressional inaction can
bypass the Constitution’s procedural hurdles to enacting legislation, and can
eliminate the President from the process altogether. “[I]n view of the specific
and constitutional procedures required for the enactment of legislation, it would
seem hardly justifiable to treat as having legislative effect any action or
nonaction not taken in accordance with the prescribed procedures.”270
These are powerful criticisms of legislative acquiescence arguments, and
they have gained ascendancy along with the rise of textualism. But they do not
require courts to ignore the significance of congressional silence in the context of
certification. Congress’s nonresponse to a judicial query about the meaning of a
statute should be given legal weight by the certifying court not because it tells
that court anything about Congress’s view of statutory meaning, but rather
because it gives the court information about the role Congress is willing to let the
courts play in statutory interpretation.271
Normally, the judiciary serves as Congress’s agent by construing the statute
as instructed. Textualists believe that Congress can only instruct through
statutory text while intentionalists are willing to look at legislative history as
well, but under either theory courts are agents of the legislature. Dynamic
theorists such as Elhauge would ask courts to be agents of the current legislature
by construing the law in the way the current legislature would prefer. When a
court refers an issue of statutory ambiguity to Congress, however, it is in essence
telling Congress that it does not have enough information to serve as a faithful
agent (either to the enacting legislature or the current legislature), and that it
cannot do Congress’s bidding without clearer instructions. Congress’s refusal to
provide direction in these circumstances has meaning, I argue, because it forces
the agent (the court) to act without guidance from its principal (Congress).
Congressional silence lets the court know that it is free to craft its own
substantive policy where Congress has given the court none to apply. That is, the
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agent has free rein to act in accord with its own views rather than those of its
principal when the principal has been unclear and refuses to give the agent
further instructions.
Significantly, the argument that courts have greater latitude to engage in
lawmaking when Congress has not responded to a judicial question about
statutory meaning is based primarily on the legislative action that led to the
court’s review of the problem legislation. To get to the point where the court
can, on its own, draft legislation to fill gaps or reconcile inconsistencies,
Congress had to affirmatively enact legislation: First, it had to enact the statute
at issue that the court is now trying to decipher; and second, it had to enact
legislation giving the federal courts jurisdiction over litigation concerning the
statute. It is the combination of a grant of jurisdiction to decide the case, a
federal statute that the court is required to administer, and Congress’s refusal to
answer the court’s request to clarify the statute that leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the court itself must legislate to resolve the ambiguity.
Congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, be it implicit or explicit,
is nothing new. Courts view Congress as having delegated lawmaking power
every time they give agencies deference to construe their governing statutes or
apply one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal judges are often
described as politically unaccountable, but they have at least as much political
legitimacy as an appointed agency official. Furthermore, judges often engage in
lawmaking when they believe Congress has given them that leeway – for
example, by enacting a broadly-worded statute such as the Sherman Act.272 The
same rationale supports the federal courts’ authority to craft federal common law
– an authority that arises from the need to fill interstices in federal statutory
schemes and the reality that courts are the only federal institution capable, at the
time the case is before it, of filling those gaps. So there is nothing shocking
about the judiciary taking over the lawmaking function when Congress has failed
to clarify the meaning of the statutory text courts must apply.273
The proposal here does not require courts to seek congressional input when
acting to flesh out the meaning of broadly-worded statutes like the Sherman
Act.274 But when Congress has enacted a detailed statute that does not appear to
grant courts lawmaking authority, it makes sense for courts to seek congressional
input before engaging in law-making. If an agent receives detailed directions
from its principal, but some portions of those directions are less than clear, it is
reasonable to think that the agent should first seek clarification before attempting
to guess at, or manufacture, the missing pieces. Only when the principal refuses
to clarify is the agent truly free to improvise.
272

The Sherman Act has been described as “deliberately committing to the courts the
task of evolving ‘more definite standards within the general mandate.’” Ginsburg &
Huber, supra note __, at 1420 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking –
Judges Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L REV. 787, 792 (1963)).
273
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception,
Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process, 100 N.W. U. L. REV. 437, __ (2006)
(describing statutory ambiguity as sometimes a result of “conscious legislative decision,
embodied either explicitly or implicitly in the body of the statute, to delegate commonlaw-making power to the courts or, on occasion, to agencies empowered to administer the
statute”).
274
Nor should courts certify questions about ambiguous statutes that an agency is
charged with administering, because under Chevron v. NRDC agencies are the institution
delegated the authority to supply legislative meaning.

Certifying Questions to Congress

57

As a pragmatic matter, a nonresponse to a judicial referral also provides the
courts with political cover to engage in more freewheeling and creative statutory
interpretation. Critics will find it less easy to criticize courts for “activist”
interpretations of statutes if the courts have first sought legislative clarification of
ambiguous statutory text. Although courts dealing with statutory ambiguity
might be fairly described as “legislating from the bench,” it is clear that they are
doing so out of necessity, and not because they are seeking to arrogate legislative
power. Courts will never, of course, be free from criticism by those who dislike
their rulings, but judicial efforts to seek answers from the political branches
would blunt attempts to claim that judges are usurping the legislative role.
Imagine that in 2004 the Supreme Court had asked Congress to clarify Title
IX, the False Claims Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act to resolve the
questions at issue in Jackson, Graham County and Clark. And imagine that
Congress had not responded and the Court had gone ahead and decided those
cases just as it did. Would commentators have been as free with their criticism?
Possibly. But the Court would have had the added legitimacy that comes with an
attempt to defer to another branch of government that is unwilling, or unable, to
fulfill its assigned constitutional role. And the opinions themselves would have
made less of an effort to pretend to “construe” inscrutable statutes, and would
have been more forthright in describing what the Court was actually doing –
supplying law where Congress had failed to do so.
4. Undermining Legislative Coherence and Consistency.
Judges are valued for their role as guardian of the law’s continuity and
coherence. Judges integrate statutes into the greater fabric of the law and
stabilize statutory meaning through binding precedent and the doctrine of stare
decisis.275 A practice of certifying questions to Congress might undermine these
judicial attributes by giving Congress greater opportunity to alter statutory
meaning or, should Congress fail to respond when courts certify questions, by
permitting courts to engage in creative law-making that undermines the laws’
consistency and coherence. Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation have
been criticized for interfering with the development of consistent and coherent
interpretation,276 and a certification process could similarly be criticized for
disrupting settled expectations about the law.
The values of continuity and consistency in statutory interpretation are at
their least compelling in cases appropriate for certification, however. Only the
truly intractable questions of statutory ambiguity should be sent to Congress; that
is, only the questions for which reference to statutory structure, purpose, and
history can provide no answer. In those kinds of cases, courts reach different
results about statutory meaning and litigants and experts in the field have no clear
conception of what the law means or how it applies. Litigants cannot claim to
have relied on amorphous statutory language for which courts had not adopted a
consistent interpretation. Can the defendant school district in Jackson have
depended on its understanding that Title IX did not encompass claims of
retaliation when courts had differed on that question for the last ten years? Can
the plaintiff in Graham County have counted on a six-year statute of limitations
in a statute that was far from clear? Judges should resort to certification only
when there is no stable, consistent legal interpretation to adhere to, and when
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appellate courts have failed to build a coherent understanding of how the
statutory provision at issue can be interpreted so as to be situated within a larger
body of law.
Admittedly, Congress may choose to respond to the certification by
amending the law in ways that break from the spirit of the original, disrupting
settled expectations. But this change in course cannot be criticized as a failure of
continuity in the same way that one might criticize a court were it to overturn
precedent and adopt a new interpretation of statutory meaning. To state the
obvious, statutes should be construed consistently only if the statutory language
remains unchanged; once Congress amends a statute, any benefit of consistency
is immediately outweighed by the value of adhering to currently-expressed
preferences of the political branches.
As explained, Congress would likely remain silent in the face of a certified
question from a court most of the time, which arguably gives courts greater
leeway to creatively fill gaps and create statutory meaning.277 This judicial
lawmaking does not come at the expense of consistency and coherence in
statutory interpretation, however. When judges face the task of construing laws
on which there is no consensus view, by definition they will not disrupt settled
expectations about the meaning of the law. Judges engaged in this task should
have as one of their goals statutory coherence – that is, an interpretation of the
statutory text that fits within the scheme of statutes and common law rules that
already exist. And once a court does pronounce on the meaning of an ambiguous
statute that Congress has refused to clarify, its word should operate with the same
finality that courts normally give to their opinions. So, for example, if an
appellate court certifies a question to Congress, receives no response, and then
establishes legislative meaning itself, that decision should be accorded the same
respect as any other precedent, thus leading to the consistency and coherence in
statutory interpretation that is generally valued.
CONCLUSION
When courts are faced with truly inscrutable statutes, they currently have no
choice but to apply the canons of construction and interpretive theories to justify
reaching a result in the case before them. As a few judges admit, however, there
are some cases in which the tools of statutory construction can supply no answer
to the question at hand. Permitting courts to certify questions about statutory
meaning to Congress opens a channel of communication with Congress and
provides the judiciary with an alternative method of resolving hard cases.
Certification seems particularly appropriate when it would allow a court to avoid
deciding difficult constitutional questions or where Congress has left
significantly policy questions unanswered – questions that Congress, not the
courts, is better suited to answer. Moreover, by seeking congressional input,
courts protect themselves against charges of judicial overreaching that usually
accompany judicial lawmaking.
Although turning to Congress to resolve pending cases appears at first
glance to require a dangerous blurring of legislative and judicial functions, it
merely harnesses Congress’s already-existing authority to create new law to
govern pending cases – a power that Congress has consistently exercised since
the foundation of our constitutional democracy. For better or worse, Congress is
already in the business of amending statutes that affect cases before the courts,
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and the parties to litigation are already lobbying Congress to change the laws at
issue in their cases. Considering that Congress is already assisting the courts by
clarifying statutory language at issue in pending cases, albeit in an informal and
ad hoc way – it makes sense to formalize the process and give the judiciary a role
in determining when congressional input might be of assistance.

